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Overview
Within the psychological literature, the self-conscious emotion of shame is proving 
to be an area of growing interest. This thesis addresses the application of this 
emotion, as well as self and social evaluative processes, to our understanding of 
offenders, specifically those high in psychopathic traits.
Part 1 reviews the literature concerning emotionality within psychopathy, in order to 
assess the capabilities, as well as the deficits that people with psychopathic traits 
demonstrate. Emotions classified as ‘moral’ or ‘self-conscious’, namely empathy, 
sympathy, guilt, remorse, shame, embarrassment and pride, are investigated. From 
the review it is clear that psychopaths are not the truly unemotional individuals that 
they are commonly portrayed as being, but instead experience many emotions to 
varying degrees. This paper concludes by highlighting possible areas for further 
exploration and research.
Part 2 reports on an empirical investigation into the prevalence of social rank, social 
expectations, and emotionality, particularly the self-conscious emotion of shame, 
within psychopathy. The paper also considers the inter-relationships between these 
emotions amongst a sample of offenders as a whole. The study highlights the worth 
of considering different treatment approaches for the different subtypes of 
psychopathy identified.
Part 3 reflects on the process of having carried out the above research. This paper is 
divided into two broad sections. The first, considers methodological issues, such as
1
the self-report method, and the dynamic between male offender participants and a 
female researcher. Within the second section, systemic issues are considered and 
personal reflections are provided, in the hope that this may assist future researchers, 
who may be interested in carrying out research within prisons.
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Part 1: Literature Review
Emotional capability: Are psychopaths truly callous 
and unemotional?
Abstract
This paper presents a review of the theory and empirical evidence that relates to 
emotionality within psychopathy, in order to assess the capabilities, as well as the 
deficits that people with psychopathic traits demonstrate. In doing so, many of the 
major theories that have shaped our understanding of the disorder are presented. 
Psychopathy is then reviewed in relation to many relevant emotional states, including 
the emotions of anger and anxiety. In addition, emotions classified as ‘moral’ or ‘self 
conscious’, namely empathy, sympathy, guilt, remorse, shame, embarrassment and 
pride, are also investigated. From this review it is clear that psychopaths are not the 
truly unemotional individuals that they are commonly portrayed as being, but instead 
experience many emotions to varying degrees. This paper concludes by highlighting 
possible areas for further exploration and research.
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1. Introduction
Cleckley (1941) described psychopathy as an inherently paradoxical syndrome, one 
in which severe behavioural maladjustment and positive psychological adjustment go 
hand in hand. Thus he wrote:
In all the orthodox psychoses, ... there is more or less obvious alteration o f  
reasoning processes or o f  some other demonstrable personality feature. In 
the psychopath, this is not seen. The observer is confronted with a convincing 
mask o f sanity (Cleckley, 1941, p. 368).
Psychopathy is characterized by irresponsibility, impulsivity, antisocial behaviour, an 
inability to learn from punishment and a lack of long-term goals (Cleckley, 1941). As 
such, the ‘psychopath’ has been described as being morally insane; an untreatable 
misfit, whose aggression and antisocial behaviour is so inherent, that it requires little 
external or environmental stimulation (van Honk & Schutter, 2006). It has been 
widely reported that the motivation for such unrestrained violence and antisocial acts 
is provided by a lack of fear and empathy, whilst it has been asserted that the 
psychopath is able to access his many victims through the use of an impenetrable 
mask o f sanity (Cleckley, 1941), a fa<?ade whereby ‘victims’ are charmed and 
persuaded of the normality of their assailant, prior to the ‘attack’. Phillippe Pinel 
(c .1800’s , cited in van Honk & Schutter, 2006) coined the term ‘insanity without the 
delirium’ referring to the presence of an emotional dysfunction in the absence of 
distress. Cleckley (1941) who carried out an extensive qualitative-type analysis of 
the presentation, suggested that psychopaths suffer from an ‘emotional poverty’. He 
went on to assert that although psychopaths are able to gain the linguistic component
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of emotions, the experiential element is either reduced or missing within these 
individuals, when compared with the normal population. It is this phenomenon, that 
is, the depth and degree to which psychopaths can experience emotions, which this 
review will attempt to explore.
Today, psychopathy is characterized as a personality disorder (PD) with a distinctive 
pattern of affective, interpersonal, and behavioural symptoms, and is related, though 
not identical, to Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) (Hare, Cooke, & Hart, 
1999; Kirsch & Becker, 2007). Psychopathy is considered by many psychologists, to 
be a higher order construct, encompassing a high degree of personality traits 
associated with DSM-IV (Diagnostic Statistical Manual: 4th Edition, American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria for many of the other personality disorders, 
including narcissistic, histrionic, borderline and paranoid PD (Blackburn, 1993; Hart 
& Hare, 1989). It has been widely reported that affective features include shallow 
affect, lack of remorse and lack of empathy, while interpersonal features include 
glibness, superficial charm, grandiosity and an ability to deceive and manipulate 
others for maximum personal gain. Behavioural features have included impulsivity, 
irresponsibility and antisocial acts. Consistent with other personality disorders, the 
above traits typically appear during early development and are pervasive and 
enduring across the lifespan (Frick, Kimonis, Dandreaux & Farell, 2003; Kirsch & 
Becker, 2007; and Rutherford, Cacciola, Alterman, McKay & Cook, 1999). It is 
estimated that psychopaths comprise 20 to 30 percent of the North American 
prison/forensic population (Harpur & Hare, 1994; and Widiger, Cadoret, Hare, 
Robins, Rutherford, Zanarini, et al., 1996), with around 15 to 20 percent making up 
the figures for European populations (Hare, Cooke & Hart, 1999). In the general
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population, the prevalence of psychopathy has been estimated as less than one 
percent (Pitchford, 2001), although some researchers state that this number cannot be 
effectively estimated due to the unknown quantity of psychopaths in the non­
offender community, sometimes referred to as ‘successful’ psychopaths, who have 
yet to be reliably measured (Hall & Benning, 2006; Hare, Cooke & Hart, 1999; 
Ishikawa, Raine, Lencz, Bihrle & LaCasse, 2001; Kirsch & Becker, 2007; Lykken,
1995).
This paper will first outline the study selection used for this review before 
introducing the construct of psychopathy, including its origin, the way in which it is 
assessed and many of the major theories that have shaped our understanding of the 
disorder. This section will include a brief review of a vast literature that focuses on a 
cognitive and/or neurological perspective of the etiology of the disorder. Following 
this, the topic of ‘emotion’ will be introduced, including a summary of the many 
ways in which emotions are conceptualized and empirically studied. Finally, 
psychopathy will be reviewed in relation to many relevant emotional states, 
including those emotions classified as ‘moral’ and/or ‘self conscious’. By providing 
a review of current theory and empirical evidence relating to the emotional 
capabilities and deficits of individuals with psychopathic traits this paper will 
conclude by putting forward some suggestions for possible areas for further research.
1.1 Study Selection
A pragmatic search of the literature was carried out using psychlNFO (Search range: 
1806-2008). The terms included in the search were: ‘emotion’, ‘anxiety’, ‘fear’, 
‘anger’, ‘empathy’, ‘sympathy’, ‘shame’, ‘guilt’, ‘remorse’ ‘embarrassment’, ‘pride’,
11
‘self conscious emotion’ and ‘moral emotion’. These items were all then crossed 
with ‘psychopath’. It was decided that the search item ‘antisocial personality 
disorder’ would not be included within this review as it was the intention of this 
review to survey only literature that considered the specific factors related to the 
construct of psychopathy and not the broader constructs of ‘criminality’, ‘antisocial 
behaviour’ and/or ‘personality disorder’. That said, within the literature examined, it 
was found that the term ‘psychopathy’ was defined broadly, and included researcher, 
as well as, self-report ratings. The search was restricted to studies that involved male 
participants because, although studies are beginning to be carried out with female 
participants, it is believed that the current knowledge of this cohort is insufficient to 
allow for assumptions of generality across the construct of psychopathy (Verona & 
Vitale, 2006). Furthermore, initial evidence has suggested that there are definite 
performance differences between the two groups on some psychometric measures of 
psychopathy, specifically the PCL-R (Verona & Vitale, 2006). As a result of this, 
studies using female samples have been excluded from this review. The total number 
of ‘relevant’ journal articles and books found was eighty-seven. An additional 
twenty-four sources were found as a result of scanning the abstracts and/or the 
reference sections of the initial sources.
2. Psychopathy
2.1 The Origins of the Construct of Psychopathy
Cleckley’s classic monograph, The Mask o f Sanity (1941, 1976), which presented 
fifteen case descriptions of psychopaths, continues to provide a vital point of 
reference for theorists, researchers and clinicians alike, with much of his initial 
material remaining relatively unchallenged to this date. Furthermore, his set of
12
sixteen diagnostic criteria, formulated from his initial case studies, has served as the 
basis for the development of Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist (PCL, 1980; PCL-R, 
1991). The PCL-Revised (PCL-R) is regarded by many, as the ‘gold standard’ 
assessment tool for psychopathy. Cleckley’s proposed etiological model of the 
disorder also inspired Lykken’s (1957) seminal study of ‘anxiety in the sociopathic 
personality’ (Patrick, 2006). Nonetheless, there are undoubtedly differences between 
Cleckley’s construct of psychopathy and that embodied by the PCL-R, as described 
in detail by Hare (1980, 1991, 1993). Specifically, these differences relate to the 
emotional components of anger and anxiety. Further exploration of these positions, 
as well as the empirical evidence to support them, will be considered throughout this 
review.
2.2 Assessment of Psychopathy
As noted above, for some time, the gold standard for the assessment of psychopathy 
has been thought by many psychologists to be the PCL-R (Hare, 1991). The PCL-R 
combines a semi-structured interview with a detailed review of a person’s records to 
form a clinical judgment of the personality traits and behaviours that are central to 
this construct. In order to obtain a clinical diagnosis, in North America, scores of 30 
or greater are considered to be indicative of psychopathy (Hare, 1991), whilst in the 
UK, this figure is set at 28 or greater. For research purposes, scores above 25 are 
generally considered to be indicative of individuals with high psychopathic traits. 
The PCL-R is comprised of two distinct, yet moderately correlated factors (Harpur, 
Hare, & Hakstian, 1989). Factor 1 describes the affective and interpersonal features 
of psychopathy, which are considered by many to be the core of the disorder, while
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Factor 2 reflects an unstable and antisocial lifestyle, and includes features that are 
predominantly behavioural in nature.
Existing crime data suggest that the PCL-R is a measure with great clinical utility. 
For example, data on re-offending rates shows that individuals that score over the cut 
off on the PCL-R are three times more likely to offend (Hare, 1991; Douglas, 
Vincent & Edens, 2006). However, evidence concerning the etiology of the ‘PCL-R 
psychopath’, is less consistent. Brinkley (2004) proposed that one potential source of 
the inconsistent evidence is that psychopathy is a construct, like learning disability, 
that is etiologically heterogeneous.
Other researchers and clinicians have noted a tendency for the PCL-R to over ascribe 
or diagnose psychopathy (Newman & Lorenz, 2003). This occurs due to the fact that 
the PCL-R protocol does not involve any examination or measurement of anxiety 
and as a result, those offenders with reasonably high levels of anxiety can still be 
diagnosed with psychopathy, which for many psychologists is somewhat of a 
contradiction in terms. As a result of this short fall, some researchers have taken to 
adding an anxiety measure, when using the PCL-R (Newman, Patterson, Howland, & 
Nichols, 1990) and have subsequently utilised sub-categories of psychopathy, such 
as ‘primary psychopaths’, those with low anxiety scores, and ‘secondary 
psychopaths’, those with high anxiety scores (Karpman, 1948; Blackburn, 1975; 
1986; 1987). However, many studies have shown that an anxiety index of passive 
avoidance is dysfunctional in the primary psychopath (Arnett, 1997), suggesting that 
‘secondary psychopathy’ might better be encompassed by the diagnostic category of 
Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) (Fowles, 2000; van Honk & Schutter, 2006).
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Other measures of psychopathy include self-report measures, specifically the 
Psychopathic Deviate (Pd) scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI; Hathaway & McKinley, 1943), the Socialization Scale (So) of the California 
Psychological Inventory (CPI, Gough, 1957) and more recently, the Psychopathic 
Personality Inventory-Revised (PPI-R, Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005). Unlike earlier 
inventories, the PPI-R is a self-report measure of psychopathy, which is intended to 
comprehensively and exclusively assess for personality traits associated with the 
disorder of psychopathy, with the further utility that it can be used in offender and 
community samples alike. The PPI-R includes validity scales to identify malingering, 
under-reporting and inconsistent responding. In addition, the inclusion of elements of 
psychopathy, more closely conceptualized by Cleckley, means that the PPI-R has 
gone someway to producing data on a more homogeneous group, and allows ‘high 
anxiety’ or ‘secondary’ psychopaths to be better grouped within the disorder of 
ASPD (Benning, Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen, & Krueger, 2003; Edens, Poythress, & 
Watkins, 2001).
2.3 Major Theoretical Contributions
Since Cleckley's first description of the psychopathic personality, many 
psychological theories of psychopathy have been put forward, each partly supported 
by empirical evidence. The following section will attempt to introduce the major 
theories and models of psychopathy in order to begin to make sense of the complex 
role that emotions might play in the etiology and maintenance of the disorder.
Although differing with respect to the hypothesized nature of the deficiency, many 
theorists who seek to define the construct, share a common view of psychopathy as
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resulting from a core, over-arching deficit that impairs the individual's ability to 
become socialized (Kirsch & Becker, 2007). In contrast to this, some personality 
theorists argue that most of the deficits proposed by both researchers and clinicians 
cannot be subsumed under a single construct that stems from a single etiological 
mechanism, and instead suggest that psychopathy is more likely to be a constellation 
of personality traits from a more general model of personality (Lynam & Derefinko, 
2006).
In line with the first view, the Frontal Lobe Dysfunction hypothesis (Gorenstein, 
1982) posited that damage to the frontal lobe, with its related disruption to executive 
functioning causes aggression and general antisocial behaviour. However, frontal 
lobe dysfunction has only been associated with ‘reactive’ or emotion based 
aggression. Therefore, the Frontal Lobe Dysfunction hypothesis does not offer an 
explanation for the high levels of ‘instrumental’, or goal directed aggression, that is 
so often associated with individuals with psychopathy (Cornell, Warren, Hawk, 
Stafford, Oram & Pine, 1996).
Lykken's (1957, 1995) Low Fear and Fear Dysfunction models posit that people 
who have innately low levels of fearfulness are harder to socialize due to the fact 
that they fail to experience fear or anxiety in the face of punishment. This lack of 
fear is thought to translate into a motivational deficit in psychopaths. Many 
psychologists have criticized this theory as being too general. For example, Hare 
(1998) has argued that low fear or anxiety accounts for only some of the features of 
psychopathy, whilst others have noted that fear conditioning is a poor predictor of
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moral socialization compared with fostering empathy during development 
(Hoffman, 1984, and Blair, Jones, Clark & Smith, 1997).
In attempting to build upon Lykken's work, Patrick and Lang (1999) suggested that 
the emotional detachment and the behavioural disinhibition components of 
psychopathy are two separate, but often co-occurring entities characterized by 
deficits in distinct brain regions and functions. Patrick and Lang (1999) suggest that 
while the emotional detachment component probably results from deficient fear 
responding, impulsive antisocial acts are better accounted for by a deficit in higher 
information processing systems that may then interact with motive systems, such as 
fear. Newman and colleagues also understand psychopathy with regard to deficits 
in information processing, specifically ‘response modulation’ (Newman, 1998; 
Patterson & Newman, 1993). Response modulation (RM) involves the “rapid and 
relatively automatic shift of attention from the effortful planning and 
implementation of goal-directed behaviour to its evaluation” (Newman, Schmitt & 
Voss, 1997). The RM model is an attention-based model. Dysfunction within the 
system responsible for response modulation is thought to limit a person’s ability to 
attend to, and therefore process feedback, specifically negative feedback, from the 
environment, rendering them less able to regulate their behaviour once it has been 
initiated. Newman (1998) argues that it is not that psychopaths are unable to 
regulate their behaviour; more that it requires an increased effort because of a lack 
of automatic responses that guide their actions. This model therefore predicts that 
individuals with psychopathy will be more likely than non-psychopathic individuals 
to persist in a previously rewarded response, even if the rate of punishment for this 
response increases. Support for this prediction comes from a series of studies
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employing a card-playing task, in which, under conditions of partial reinforcement, 
psychopaths chose to continue to view cards for a far greater amount of time than 
controls, after rewards had decreased (Newman, Patterson & Kosson, 1987).
Blair and colleagues (Blair, 1995, 2005, and Blair, Jones, Clark, & Smith, 1997) 
also attribute psychopathy to cognitive deficits. In particular, they view 
psychopathic behaviour as resulting from a defective Violence Inhibition 
Mechanism (VIM). This hypothesis was developed from the work of the ethologists 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1970) and Lorenz (1981), who proposed that most social animals 
possess mechanisms for the control of aggression. Blair (2005) notes that 
submission cues displayed to an aggressor should trigger autonomic arousal, which 
subsequently inhibits attack behaviour. For example, an aggressor dog will cease 
fighting if its opponent bares its throat. The VIM is considered to be a physiological 
system that becomes activated in response to distress cues in others. Proponents of 
this model argue that within psychopaths there is a failure in the activation of the 
inhibitory behavioural mechanism. In line with conditioning principles, continual 
inactivation of the VIM during harmful acts results in a failure to associate these 
acts with personally aversive physiological sensations. In turn, this leads to a failure 
to develop empathy, produces poor moral socialization, and increases the likelihood 
that the individual will engage in acts of instrumental aggression.
A recent cognitive neuroscience perspective on psychopathy has been developed by 
Blair (2005). He reviewed the above cognitive and neuroscience models of 
psychopathy: the Frontal Lobe Dysfunction Model, the Fear Dysfunction Model, the 
Response Modulation Model and the Violence Inhibition Model. As a result of his
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review, he proposed the Integrated Emotion Systems (IES) model. This model can be 
considered an integration of the Fear Dysfunction and VIM models, but also suggests 
a primary amygdala dysfunction in psychopathy, as proposed by Patrick (1994). 
Similarly to previous hypotheses, this deficit is believed to disrupt the ability of the 
individual with psychopathy to form stimulus-response associations, particularly 
stimulus-punishment associations, thereby interfering with ‘normal’ socialization. 
The psychopathic individual is considered less likely to learn to avoid the use of 
antisocial behaviour to achieve their goals. Instead, they appear to go out of their 
way to use antisocial behaviour instrumentally to achieve their desires, due to the 
fact that they are able to experience the receipt of the potential reward, e.g. financial 
gain, sexual pleasure, power, etc., without the experience of the ‘cost’ of the 
victim/s’ distress. Consistent with the Frontal Lobe Dysfunction model and the RM 
model, the IES model suggests frontal cortex dysfunction, specifically locating this 
in the orbital/ventrolateral region. It is believed that this deficit disrupts the systems 
necessary for the rapid alteration of responding, following contingency change, and 
can help to explain why psychopaths are at an increased risk of frustration based 
reactive aggression, as well as the instrumental aggression, as noted above.
In proposing this model, Blair (2005) raises the question of why there appears to be 
two forms of cerebral pathology in psychopathy; that is, amygdala and 
orbital/ventrolateral dysfunction. He offers three possible hypotheses for this. The 
first hypothesis suggests that, due to the amygdala dysfunction, the required output 
does not reach the orbital/ventrolateral frontal cortex effectively. The second 
possibility is that the two types of pathology are linked to a single pathology at a 
different level, for example, disruption within a single neurotransmitter system. The
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final suggestion that Blair (2005) offers relates to the possible lifestyle of individuals 
with psychopathy, i.e. their increased likelihood of drug use, which has been 
associated with frontal cortex dysfunction (Rogers & Robbins, 2001).
In summary, many psychological theories of psychopathy have been put forward, 
proposing links between emotion-processing deficits, cognitive deficits and 
dysfunctional socialization. However, proponents of these theories vary in the degree 
to which they consider psychopathy to be a bottom up or a top down phenomenon, 
and whether it is most likely to stem from an emotional or an attentional deficit. 
Cognitive theories, particularly proposals of dysfunctional information processing 
mechanisms, have been routed to deficits in neuro-anatomy, specifically within the 
amygdala and areas of the frontal cortex. However, as Newman (1998) points out, 
these theories need not be mutually exclusive and later we will consider how 
empirical evidence can be used in support of a number of different 
conceptualizations of psychopathy.
3. Emotion
According to Lang (1995) it is generally believed that emotions can be 
conceptualized as states of ‘readiness for action’ reflecting activity in two basic 
motivational systems; the first, an appetitive system that mediates approach 
behaviour, with the second, a defensive system, which mediates withdrawal 
behaviour. Research into emotionality has similarly resulted in two approaches for 
classifying emotions. The first conceptualizes emotional affect along two 
dimensions: valence’, which describes the extent of pleasure or sadness, and 
‘arousal’, which describes the extent of calmness or excitation (Lang, Bradley, &
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Cuthbert, 1990). The second emphasizes a categorical approach, describing six 
basic, universally recognized, facial expressions of emotion, i.e. happiness, sadness, 
anger, surprise, fear, and disgust (Ekman & Friesen, 1972). In general, 
psychophysiological research has adopted the dimensional approach, whilst 
researchers studying emotion recognition and empathy have tended to utilize the 
categorical approach.
3.1 Assessment of Emotion
Emotion researchers suggest that emotional expression involves the activation of 
separate, but interrelated response systems, including those related to patterns of 
behaving, expressive and evaluative language, and physiological changes mediated 
by the somatic and autonomic nervous systems (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998). 
The literature reviewed below reflects a range of different research methods. While 
behavioural observations and self report measures are considered to be useful 
indicators of emotionality, recently many researchers have tended to rely more 
heavily on objective physiological correlates of emotional states, due to the fact that 
both language and behaviours are more conscious representations that are subject to 
bias or distortion within participants (Kirsch & Becker, 2007). Specific 
psychophysiological systems have been found to be consistently associated with 
aspects of emotional experience (Lang et al., 1998) and can be used to measure both 
emotional arousal and valence; these include measures of startle reflex, heart rate 
variations, corrugator electromyographic (EMG) (a measurement of the frown 
muscle), and galvanic skin response (GSR). By observing these responses, 
researchers can test whether certain groups of individuals show different patterns of 
emotional responses when presented with similar stimuli.
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3.2 Emotional Processing in Psychopathy
As noted above, abnormal emotional processing is believed to be a hallmark of 
psychopathy. However, cognitive deficits associated with psychopathy do not appear 
to fit established models of cognitive dysfunction, such as executive deficits or 
difficulty with sustained attention. It is therefore thought that psychopaths have 
adequate cognitive resources and capacity, but appear to have difficulties 
maintaining an adaptive balance between top-down and bottom-up processing (Hiatt 
& Newman, 2007). In support of this view, Herve, Hayes and Hare (2003) 
demonstrated that psychopaths show a tendency not to understand or effectively 
utilize the emotional content of language. In their study, Herve et al. asked 
participants to choose two words from a triad, which they believed to be most similar 
in meaning. The psychopathic cohort made more sorting errors on the emotional 
metaphor ‘Q sort task’ than their non-psychopathic counterparts, despite having good 
literacy understanding. Moreover, Hare, Williamson and Harpur (1988) found that 
psychopaths group words on the basis of their literal meaning (e.g. antonyms), whilst 
non-psychopaths more often utilize the word’s connotation, as a basis for 
categorisation. In a more recent study, Long and Titone (2007) demonstrated that 
individuals with high psychopathic traits were less efficient, than their low trait 
counterparts, in processing negatively valanced words. This was shown across all 
levels of word abstractness, again supporting accounts of emotional processing 
difficulties within psychopathy.
Other research suggests that psychopaths show a severe disruption in emotional 
responding and social functioning (Mitchell, Richell, Leonard & Blair, 2006). 
Mitchell and colleagues (2006) asked participants to complete an Emotional Interrupt
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Task, in which they were asked to respond to target stimuli with right or left button 
presses to shapes that were temporarily bracketed by positive, negative or neutral 
images. Participants with psychopathy showed no increase in response latencies 
when the target stimuli were bracketed by positive or negative images, compared to 
neutral images, suggesting that individuals with psychopathic personality traits were 
not affected by varying degrees of emotionality.
3.3 Emotional Experience in Psychopathy
3.3.1 Psychopathy & Anger
Counter to the previously common perception of psychopaths as being aggressive 
and/or murderous predators, Cleckley (1941, 1976) explicitly noted that, although 
persistent antisocial deviance was characteristic of these individuals, serious violence 
and aggression was not central to the construct of psychopathy. Indeed, although 
many of Cleckley’s case illustrations report some features of anger and aggression, 
these commentaries appear to sit alongside several accounts of friendliness, affability 
and cooperativeness. Furthermore, even within the examples of those who exhibited 
tendencies towards aggression, there were no reports of impulsive rage that could not 
be controlled. Moreover, as many as one third of Cleckley’s fifteen case studies 
include no mention of verbal or physical aggression (Patrick, 2006). As a result, 
Cleckley maintained that the underlying affective disposition of the psychopath, their 
‘emotional poverty’, actually mitigates against hostile grudges or angry, vengeful 
displays:
“It is my opinion that when the typical psychopath... occasionally commits a 
major deed o f violence, it is usually a causal act done not from tremendous 
passion or as a result o f plans persistently followed with earnest compelling
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fervor. ... The psychopath is not volcanically explosive, at the mercy o f  
irresistible drives and overwhelming rages o f  temper. Often he seems 
scarcely wholehearted, even in wrath and wickedness (Cleckley, 1976, 
p.263).
It is notable that Cleckley’s position on psychopathy and aggression is at odds with 
Hare’s construct of the disorder, where hostility, anger, cold-heartedness and 
aggression occupy a more central role (Patrick, 2006). Indeed, there has been much 
empirical evidence indicating that psychopathy, as determined by the PCL-R, shows 
its strongest associations with personality traits of aggression and antagonism 
(Lynam & Derefinko, 2006), and PCL-R scores have reliably been found to predict 
aggressive behaviour and violent recidivism within criminal offenders (Douglas, 
Vincent & Edens, 2006). However, Patrick and Zempolich (1998) note a limitation 
of many studies that utilise the PCL-R, in that they are highly susceptible to 
‘criterion contamination’. Specifically, Patrick et al. (1998) assert that the 
relationship between psychopathy and violence is likely to arise due to the fact that 
PCL-R ratings of psychopathy can often be inflated as a result of the presence of 
violence related information within the person’s history. In support of this assertion, 
Patrick et al. (1998) note that for studies that have employed self report indices of 
psychopathy, there has been a tendency to only find a relationship between 
psychopathy and violence when a moderating factor, for example, low IQ or high 
social withdrawal, is present. In addition, Patrick (2006) asserts that of the sixteen 
diagnostic criteria that Cleckley described, emotional and interpersonal deficits and 
behavioural deviance are well represented by the PCL-R, however, the more 
positive, psychological adjustment features, namely ‘good intelligence and social
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charm’, ‘absence of delusions and other signs of irrationality’, ‘absence of 
nervousness’ and ‘suicide rarely carried out’, are not featured, especially when 
careful comparison of the wording between the two criterion is performed (Patrick, 
2006). Patrick (2006) claims that the absence of indicators of positive psychological 
adjustment among the items of the PCL-R has occurred due to the fact that indicators 
that did not contribute to the reliability of the overall scale were abandoned. This has 
subsequently resulted in a measure that concentrates almost exclusively on deviance 
and maladjustment, and departs in many ways from Cleckley’s original criterion set.
That aside, there have not been many empirical studies that have explicitly 
investigated emotionality, specifically anger, and its role in violence or aggression 
within psychopathy. Instead, much research has considered victim characteristics 
when attempting to understand the emotions that may precede the aggressive acts of 
psychopaths. For example, Williamson, Hare and Wong (1987) found that the 
victims of psychopaths were more often strangers, whereas non-psychopaths usually 
knew their victims. Moreover, studies of crime data have found that psychopaths 
inflict less harm to their victims than non-psychopaths, with homicide rates again 
being higher within non-psychopathic populations (Hare & McPherson, 1984). 
Psychopaths are instead thought to utilise more ‘instrumental’ aggression, i.e. threats 
and intimidation, which are considered to be a marker of more pathological 
development, than emotion based or ‘reactive’ forms of aggression, the more 
pervasive form of violent crime (Cornell, Warren, Hawk, Stafford, Oram & Pine,
1996). In line with these findings, Williamson et al. (1987) investigated the apparent 
motives of many violent crimes and found that, more often than not, the crimes of 
those high in psychopathy involved material gain, whereas for non-psychopaths,
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strong emotional arousal appeared to precede acts of aggression. In addition, 
although it has been found that psychopaths engage in more aggressive and 
disruptive behaviour in prison, researchers have found that a substantial amount of 
this behaviour is aimed at controlling others, rather than as a result of high 
emotionality (Hare & McPherson, 1984). From the weight of this evidence, it has 
been suggested that psychopaths, although able to carry out impulsive acts, may not 
be able to form the kind of deep interpersonal attachments to others, which 
precipitate strong emotional reactions that can lead to many forms of violent 
offending (Patrick & Zempolich, 1998).
That said, evidence suggests that psychopaths can, and do, experience anger. Using 
PCL scores, Serin (1991) divided a sample of participants into those high or low in 
psychopathy. Serin (1991) noted that those with high PCL scores do not differ from 
those with low psychopathy scores in their levels of reported anger as assessed by the 
Novaco Anger Scale (Novaco, 1975) or reported hostility, as measured by the 
Overcontrolled-Hostility Scale (Megaree, Cook & Mendelsohn, 1967). Moreover, 
when asked to attribute emotionality to the people in a series of vignettes of 
frustrating situations, those with high PCL scores actually reported greater levels of 
anger. However, the psychopaths did not differ from the non-psychopaths with 
regard to how they expected to respond to such situations or in their attributions of 
hostile intent from others in the vignettes, again suggesting that a level of control or 
detachment tempers their anger.
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3.3.2 Psychopathy, Anxiety & Fear
Cleckley (1941) considered abnormally low levels of anxiety to be a core element of 
psychopathy, with the majority of his case studies presenting as lacking in 
nervousness, concern, tension, anxiety, stress or any form of “psycho-neurosis”. In 
fact, he noted that many of the individuals within his cohort demonstrated 
abnormally high levels of calmness and self-assurance. In line with this view, as 
noted above, the Low Fear Model (Lykken, 1957) states that psychopathic 
disturbance has its foundations in, and is supported by, the absence of fear (Lykken, 
1957). It is asserted that fearfulness ensures an inability to respond to, and learn 
from, the punishing consequences of antisocial and violent behaviour. Passive 
avoidance, that is, a tendency to avoid behaviour that has previously been contingent 
with aversive or punishing stimuli, has been found to a lesser extent in psychopaths, 
when compared with the normal population (Lykken, 1957). This finding has been 
replicated in many subsequent studies, which have used either an aversive- 
conditioning paradigm or observed the frequency and severity of physiological 
arousal, e.g. startle reflex, heart rate, corrugator electromyographic (EMG) and 
galvanic skin response (GSR), all of which are considered to be reduced in people 
who experience low levels of fear (Kirsch & Becker, 2007).
Whilst studying individuals with psychopathic traits, researchers have noted a 
definite deficit in emotional response to fear inducing situations. Patrick, Cuthbert 
and Lang (1994) asked participants to read six neutral and six fearful sentences. Each 
fearful scene included at least one autonomic (e.g., "my heart pounds") or 
behavioural (e.g., "I tense") response descriptor, designed to enhance activation of 
efferent components in associative memory (Miller, Levin, Kozak, Cook, McLean, &
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Lang, 1987). Researchers found that psychopaths exhibited significantly less 
differentiation in heart rate between the fearful and neutral sentence stimuli. In 
addition, Patrick, Bradley and Lang (1993) demonstrated that psychopaths display 
unusual startle responses, as measured by the number of eye blinks following neutral, 
pleasant and unpleasant visual stimuli. Compared with controls, the psychopaths 
showed diminished startle responses to the unpleasant slides. However, no difference 
was found for pleasant or neutral images, suggesting that differences in attention 
were not related to the observed outcome. Psychopaths have also been found to 
demonstrate significant startle inhibition during exposure to victim scenes. 
Levenston, Patrick, Bradley and Lang (2000) showed participants images of 
mutilations and attacks on others, as well as scenes that should induce feelings of 
personal threat. Participants with high PCL-R scores showed a marked decrease on a 
range of physiological responses, when compared with those of non-psychopaths. 
This reported evidence of psychopaths’ decreased physiological arousal on a range of 
aversive conditioning paradigms, (whilst demonstrating that their ability to attend to 
such stimuli is equal, or in some cases superior, to that of non-psychopaths) suggests 
support for a model of psychopathy, which posits low fear as a central component of 
psychopathy. In line with this view, it has been suggested that Lykken’s Low Fear 
Model does not deviate, to any meaningful degree, from another model of 
psychopathy, namely the Motivational Imbalance Model, which also considers the 
issues of sensitivity to punishment and reward as fundamental within psychopathy 
(van Honk & Schutter, 2006). Arnett (1997) suggests that a weak inhibition and a 
strong activation system is at play within the psychopath, with punishment being 
particularly ineffective when it conflicts with reward. Arnett (1997) analyzed heart 
rate measures to monetary incentives. He showed that short-term reward is favoured,
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even when the psychopathic individual has the knowledge that this will be followed 
by extreme future punishment.
Further evidence has been put forward within the cognitive neuroscience literature, 
which suggests that the above phenomenon of behavioural inhibition and activation 
depend on neuroanatomical and neurohormonal substrates, which have been found to 
be defective in psychopaths. Specifically, it has been shown that imbalances in the 
activity in and between the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal and the hypothalamic- 
pituitary-gonadal axes, measured in terms of the ratio of cortisol and testosterone 
levels, are related to the above behaviours (van Honk & Schutter, 2006). However, 
van Honk and Schutter (2006) posit that passive avoidance in the psychopath, rather 
than being directly related to punishment insensitivity or low levels of fear, is instead 
better explained as the result of poor ‘anxiety mediated avoidance learning’. In line 
with this view, the ‘Somatic Marker Hypothesis’ (SMH; Damasio, 1994) puts 
forward an explanation that emotional learning is established by somatic, or bodily 
feelings that consciously, or unconsciously, mark behaviours that have either 
negative or positive outcomes for the individual (Tranel, Bechara, & Damasio, 
2000). Tranel et al. (2000) therefore suggest that punishment and reward learning 
depends on the orbitofrontal and medial regions of the prefrontal cortex (OMPFC) 
having access to amygdala-generated bodily signals. It is believed that the SMH 
accounts for aggression, which is impulsive and reactive, but is less helpful in 
explaining instrumental, goal directed aggression. As psychopaths are notable in that 
they display both forms of behaviour, van Honk and Schutter (2006) noted that the 
SMH is only of limited use in understanding the emotional, cognitive and 
neurological aspects of the psychopath.
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In line with views that psychopaths experience low levels of fear and anxiety, work 
into the attentional biases of psychopaths have revealed that they experience a 
reduced sensitivity to threat than a non-psychopathic cohort (Arnett, 1997). Arnett 
(1997) asserted that dysfunctions in emotional processing can be assessed by 
observing the way in which individuals attend, and subsequently respond, to threat. 
Cognitive hypervigilance and increased psychophysiological responses have been 
observed within many emotional disorders; however it seems that it is 
‘hypo’vigilance that appears to mark the behaviour of the psychopath (Arnett, 1997). 
It appears that decreased levels of vigilance to environmental threat, and neglect of 
threat, play an important role in the etiology and maintenance of psychopathy by 
allowing the psychopathic individual more cognitive space to attend to the reward 
contingencies involved in certain actions, without having to be concerned with the 
risks (van Honk & de Haan, 2000; and Williams, Matthews & MacLeod, 1996).
3.3.3 Psychopathy & Moral Emotions
The discussion above indicates that psychopaths may lack ‘normal’ levels of anxiety 
and fear, given that they are hypovigilent to threat signals. Furthermore, although 
they often behave in antisocial ways, it seems that they are not constantly at the 
mercy of uncontrollable anger or rage. However, research into the emotional 
capabilities of psychopathic individuals has demonstrated that they are not globally 
incapable of experiencing or recognizing emotions. In fact, psychopaths appear to be 
very able to recognize some emotions, namely happiness, sadness and 
embarrassment (Blair, Sellars, Strickland, Clark, Williams, Smith, & Jones, 1995). 
Their ability to experience some of the more ‘moral’ emotions, e.g. empathy, 
sympathy, guilt and remorse, however, may be somewhat deficient in comparison.
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Maibom (2005) noted that all moral emotions derive from our ability and our 
inclination to share the feelings of others. Hume (1777, cited in Mackie, 1980) calls 
this ‘sympathy’, but this emotional state corresponds more closely to our current 
understanding of ‘empathy’. Nonetheless, it seems that without empathy, other moral 
emotions cannot develop, meaning that the individual will be ‘amoral’, a scenario 
that for many authors fits their description of the development of psychopathy.
3.3.3.1 Empathy
As indicated above, much has been written about the psychopath’s ability to show 
empathy, with views varying from them as having a muted or reduced capability, to 
descriptions of psychopaths as having a total deficit for this emotion.
Empathy is the capacity to share another person’s emotional world; it requires the 
cognitive ability to take another person’s perspective, to discriminate another 
person’s specific emotional experience, and demands the affective capacity to engage 
freely in one’s own range of emotions (Feshbach, 1975). Empathy is crucial to the 
development of trusting and rewarding experiences (Rogers, 1961), and is thought to 
be essential to higher social functioning (Rankin, Kramer & Miller, 2005) as it 
promotes altruistic behaviour (Eisenberg, 2000) and suppresses aggression (Saami, 
1999).
Research supports the assertion that empathy is comprised of both cognitive and 
affective elements (Cliffordson, 2002). Cognitive empathy involves perspective 
taking and reaching an intellectual understanding of another’s cognitive and affective 
state. Emotional empathy however, is a sudden powerful feeling of concern for
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another person in distress. This type of empathy does not require the cognitive 
explanation for the other person’s distress (Rankin, Kramer and Miller, 2005). It has 
been suggested that within psychopathy the reverse is true, as psychopaths have been 
found to be deficient in processing affect, such as fear and guilt (Blair, Jones, Clark 
& Smith, 1997), but have not displayed impairment in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks 
(Richell, Mitchell, Newman, Leonard, Baron-Cohen & Blair, 2003). In their study 
Richell et al. (2003) considered the link between insight into others’ emotions and 
psychopathy. Participants were asked to complete an advanced ToM test, the 
‘reading the mind in the eyes’ task. This requires participants to attempt to put 
themselves into the mind of people shown in a series of photographs, and attribute a 
relevant mental state to them. It was found that psychopaths did not display any 
deficit for emotional state recognition and did not present with a generalized 
impairment in ToM.
In a similar study carried out by Blair, Sellars, Strickland, Clark and Smith (1996), 
consistent with controls, psychopathic participants were able to provide meaningful 
responses about what other people might be feeling within differing scenarios, as 
well as what might be motivating them to act in particular ways. Moreover, in a 
study looking at the relationship between psychopathic traits and a person’s 
perception of nonverbal communication, it was found that PCL-R scores positively 
correlated with participants’ accuracy of emotional intensity ratings and assertiveness 
ratings (Book, Quinsey & Langford, 2007). It has therefore been argued that 
psychopaths are able to “manipulate, deceive and charm others” (Cleckley, 1941; 
Hare, 1993) directly because of an ability to utilize socially relevant information and 
combine it with a well-developed insight into others’ intentions, emotions and
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motivations (Blair et al., 1996; Richell et al., 2003). Rather than lacking empathy, it 
appears that psychopaths have a well developed ToM, leading some authors to refer 
to psychopaths as having, what they term, ‘callous empathy’ (Book et al., 2007).
3.3.3.2 Sympathy
Many have argued that true empathy also consists of sympathy (Tangney & Dearing, 
2002). Sympathy relates to an “affective reaction of concern, pity and/or sorrow for 
someone else’s misfortune or distress” (Oxford English Dictionary [OED], 2008), 
though sympathy, unlike empathy, does not necessarily represent a vicarious 
experience of the same emotion (Decety & Chaminade, 2003, Eisenberg, 1986), 
therefore sympathy can occur in the absence of empathy (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). 
It would follow that empathy, at a cognitive level at least, can occur without 
sympathy and it is this pattern of emotional response that appears to predominate in 
the case of psychopaths, as outlined above. However, within this review no studies 
were found explicitly measuring the experience of sympathy within psychopathy. An 
empirical study that investigated the capacity for psychopathic individuals to 
experience or understand this specific emotional state would therefore be 
advantageous.
3.3.3.3 Guilt (or Remorse)
Guilt, or remorse, is “a self-generated pang of conscience” (Tangney, 1999). As 
posited above, in order to experience guilt, one must first be able to empathize, that 
is to possess a theory of mind (ToM) or have an ability for ‘mentalization’ (Fonagy, 
Gergely, Jurist & Target, 2002). As the literature reviewed so far suggests that 
psychopaths can experience empathy, albeit of a callous type, it is thought that an
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exploration of the extent to which these individuals are capable of experiencing guilt, 
or remorse, would further aid our understanding of the specific emotional capabilities 
of the psychopath.
It seems that it is widely accepted within the literature that central to the disorder of 
psychopathy is a callous disregard for others, with many authors detailing how 
psychopaths appear to be unhampered by guilt, remorse or indeed any form of fear of 
retribution (Cooke, & Michie, 1997; Cleckley, 1941, 1979; Fine & Kennett, 2004; 
Hare, 1980, 1991, 1993; Lykken 1995; Maibom, 2005; and Patrick, 2006). In terms 
of empirical evidence, psychometric analysis of the PCL-R consistently identifies 
two factors, with ‘lack of remorse or guilt’ significantly featuring within the first 
factor, (Harpur, Hare & Hakstian, 1989). A study carried out by Blair, Sellars, 
Strickland, Clark, Williams, Smith and Jones, (1995) investigated the ability of 
psychopaths to attribute emotions to others in order to indirectly gauge the 
participant’s own emotional experiences; the rationale being that if an individual was 
unable to experience the emotions investigated, attributions would be randomly 
assigned across the given situations. Within this study, psychopaths, as measured on 
the PCL-R, and controls were presented with short vignettes of contexts, which 
should induce feelings of happiness, sadness, embarrassment or guilt. They were 
then asked to attribute feelings to the story protagonist. The psychopaths did not 
differ in their emotion attributions to the happiness, sadness or embarrassment 
stories, but did, to a large extent, for the guilt stories, with them misattributing 
feelings of either happiness or indifference.
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The above finding was predicted by Blair’s neurocognitive account of the 
psychopath, the Violence Inhibition Mechanism (VIM) model of psychopathy, as 
cited above (Blair, 1995). As noted previously, the VIM Model offers an emotion- 
based account of psychopathy, by positing that psychopaths have a fundamental 
emotional deficit, specifically a lack of empathy, which subsequently affects their 
capacity for violence inhibition (Blair, 1995). Blair (1995) noted that humans, like 
various social animals, inhibit aggressive behaviour when a conspecific aggressor 
displays submission cues (Blair, 1995, Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970, and Lorenz, 1966). 
According to this model, moral emotions, namely empathy, sympathy, guilt, and 
remorse, result from an early interpretation of arousal, generated by the activation of 
the Violence Inhibition Mechanism, when we witness a display of distress or fear. As 
noted previously, the psychopath is assumed not to have an intact VIM, and so does 
not experience these moral emotions or the subsequent behavioural control (Blair, 
1995). Support for this model has come from studies, which have suggested that 
individuals with psychopathic traits appear to be less responsive to distress cues than 
non-psychopathic individuals (Blair, Jones, Clark & Smith, 1997).
In summary, the review of the literature revealed many articles and books that 
referred to a deficit for guilt and remorse within psychopathy, but found few 
empirical studies that have specifically investigated these emotions within this 
cohort. For this reason, further empirical evidence is needed in order to understand to 
what extent psychopaths experience or understand the specific emotional state of 
guilt or remorse. This work would be highly informative to researchers, but also to 
those clinicians tasked with carrying out risk assessments and ‘victim empathy’ work 
with these types of offenders.
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3.3.4 Psychopathy & Self Conscious Emotions
Following on from the previous section, guilt, as well as being a moral emotion, is 
also considered to be a ‘self-conscious’ emotion. Self-conscious emotions are those 
that involve, as a central feature, some form of self-reflection and self-evaluation. 
They may be implicit or explicit, and can be either consciously experienced or occur 
below conscious awareness (Tangney, 1999). Examples of other self-conscious 
emotions include, shame, embarrassment and pride. These emotions, as well as their 
relationship to psychopathy, will be considered in more detail below.
3.3.4.1 Shame
The self-conscious emotion of shame is a “powerful, self-focused, affective 
experience related to negative self-evaluation” (Morrison & Gilbert, 2001). It is 
generally viewed as “a debilitating, negative emotion involving feelings of 
inferiority, powerlessness and self-consciousness” (Tangney, Miller, Flicker & 
Barlow, 1996). Goldberg (1991) posited that it is “related to the unquestioned 
conviction that in some important way, one is flawed and ineffectual”. According to 
White (1963, cited in Goldberg, 1991) “shame always involves a sense of 
incompetence”.
Gilbert (1997, 1998) has argued that there are two forms of shame. The term external 
shame (Gilbert, 1997) refers to how an individual perceives that others see them, and 
therefore pertains to a sense of failing to meet externalized standards (Goss, Gilbert 
& Allan, 1994). However, the degree to which external shame is experienced is 
dependent on how important others’ views are to the self. Hence, the experience of 
external shame is affected by cognitions about the value of others’ judgments. The
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term internal shame (Gilbert, 1997) on the other hand, concerns the idea of the self 
judging the self (Tarrier, Wells & Haddock, 1998), and pertains to a sense of failing 
to meet internalized standards.
Gilbert (1997) asserts that internal and external shame is not always interrelated. For 
example, one may feel no anxiety about one’s flaws unless one expects that they will 
be revealed (Lewis, 1992), whilst an individual can recognize that other people 
consider their behaviour shameful, but do not share this view (Gilbert, 1998). For 
example, a sex offender might understand that other people disapprove of their 
behaviour, but simultaneously have no internal shame for it themselves.
There is growing evidence that shame is associated with many psychopathologies, 
but given that it is widely reported that psychopaths see themselves as superior to 
others (Cleckley, 1941, 1976; and Hare 1991, 1993), and feel little empathy, remorse 
or shame (Hare, 1991, 1993), it had always been assumed that it had not played a 
significant role in the development or perpetuation of psychopathic disorders.
From his work with offenders in the US, Gilligan (1996, 2000) has written 
extensively on the relationship between shame and violence, positing that shame is 
“the primary or ultimate cause of all violence”. He states that in almost all of the 
cases that he has worked with, within his role as a Forensic Psychiatrist, violence has 
been provoked by the experience of feeling shamed, humiliated, ridiculed and 
disrespected, with the purpose of the violent act being to diminish the intensity of a 
person’s experienced level of shame and ultimately supplant it with a sense of pride. 
In addition, Gilligan (2000) notes that violent men often hide their deep sense of
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shame behind a defensive mask of bravado, arrogance, machismo and self- 
satisfaction. It is therefore possible that these observations about the emotion of 
shame within the general criminal population could also be pertinent to our 
understanding of the criminal psychopathic population. Specifically, it may go 
someway to explain the origins of violence within this group, and may also extend 
our understanding of the psychopath’s tendency towards narcissism, grandiosity and 
general self-promotion.
In an empirical study carried out by Morrison and Gilbert (2001) participants, 
sampled from a population of male offenders, were asked to rate their perceptions of 
internalized shame (shame proneness). Contrary to expectation, it was found that 
internalized shame levels in those with psychopathic traits were far greater than that 
found in the normal male population and furthermore, were more consistent with 
those of clinical samples, specifically alcoholics (Morrison & Gilbert, 2001). 
Morrison and Gilbert (2001) concluded that psychopaths appear to have an inner 
sense of shame such that ‘there is a feeling that, in truth, there is something flawed, 
bad or worthless about oneself, but that they are able to hold this view whilst 
maintaining their superiority to others e.g. ‘I may not be that good myself, but I’m 
still better than other people’. It therefore seems that they are more concerned with 
attempting to live up to their own personal standards than concerned with what 
others may think of them (Morrison & Gilbert, 2001).
A limitation of this study was that Morrison and Gilbert (2001) utilized the 1983 
Mental Health Act legal classification of ‘psychopathic disorder’ to identify mentally 
disordered offenders who were more likely to have a psychopathic personality. As
38
this classification is a legal definition, it has only limited clinical relevance and is an 
invalid, and therefore unreliable, method for sampling this population. Moreover, in 
an attempt to refine their sample, Morrison and Gilbert (2001) categorized their 
initial sample into ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ psychopathic subtypes by using the 
Antisocial Personality Questionnaire (APQ; Blackburn and Fawcett, 1996). As 
suggested above, a classification system based on the symptomology of Antisocial 
Personality Disorder (APSD) is arguably insensitive to the specific traits associated 
with psychopathic personality, as psychopathy shares only some characteristics with 
ASPD. Further research is therefore required to assess whether the above findings 
can be replicated within a sample that is more representative of those with 
psychopathy. In addition, exploration of the claim that the psychopath’s 
‘internalized’ versus ‘externalized’ shame levels differ, as suggested by Morrison 
and Gilbert (2001), needs also to be assessed.
3.3.4.2 Embarrassment
Miller (1995) describes embarrassment as “an aversive state of mortification, 
abashment and chagrin that follows public social predicaments”. As a result of this, it 
is sometimes considered to be the most social of the self-conscious emotions 
(Tangney, 1999). People who are prone to embarrassment tend to be highly aware of, 
and concerned with, social rules and standards (Tangney, 1999). Therefore, it could 
be hypothesized that psychopaths would not be prone to this psychological state. 
Unfortunately however, this cannot be confirmed, as there is only minimal research 
into embarrassment within psychopathy. The Blair et al. (1995) study mentioned 
above, in which participants were asked to attribute emotions to others in order for 
the researchers to indirectly gauge the participant’s own emotional experiences, is
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the only one to date that has investigated this emotion within a psychopathic cohort; 
their finding, however, that psychopaths can, and do, experience embarrassment is 
perhaps questionable given the problematic methodology utilised within this study of 
attributing experience based upon the correct identification of an emotion. As many 
authors have outlined, psychopaths are very capable of learning to read others 
(Cleckley, 1941; Hare, 1991; Hare 1993; and Patrick, 2006) and therefore, rather 
than demonstrating an ability to experience an emotion, the participants in this study 
may simply have been reflecting an ability to correctly recognize scenarios, which 
are inclined to bring about embarrassment in individuals. Support for this view 
comes from the fact that embarrassment is normally accompanied by a set of, often 
very prominent, physical features (Tangney, 1999), whilst guilt, the emotion that was 
not found within this study, conversely is considered to be a very private emotive 
state (Tangney, 1999), and as such cannot be observed in others in the same way. As 
a result, it seems possible that the participants in this study may have been reporting 
an understanding, rather than an experience, of embarrassment, whilst in the case of 
guilt the circumstances in which this emotion is likely to be present may not have 
been learned to a similar degree. Further investigation of the findings noted above, 
using a more stringent research paradigm, might therefore provide a clearer 
understanding of the emotional capabilities of the psychopath regarding experiences 
of both embarrassment and guilt.
3.3.4.3 Pride
According to Tangney (1999), of the self-conscious emotions, pride has received the 
least attention within the psychological literature, and this is certainly replicated 
within psychopathy research, with no studies found explicitly relating to the
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experience of pride within psychopathy. Pride relates to “feelings of deep pleasure or 
satisfaction derived from achievements, qualities, or possessions” (OED, 2008). An 
empirical study that investigated the capacity for psychopathic individuals to 
experience or understand this specific emotional state would therefore be highly 
informative to both clinicians and researchers alike.
4. Discussion & Summary
In 1941, Cleckley suggested that psychopaths suffer from ‘emotional poverty’, whilst 
in 1993, Hare offered an impression of psychopaths as experiencing low levels of 
fear and as having underdeveloped empathy. These views have been supported by 
much empirical evidence over the past few decades, though to differing degrees. 
Cleckley and Hare deviate from one another regarding their views on anger, hostility 
and rage within psychopathy, with Cleckley regarding psychopaths as ‘antisocially 
deviant’ rather that motivated in their actions by strong emotions. From the literature 
reviewed it seems that, in line with common assumptions and theories, those labeled 
psychopaths do indeed have a tendency to act with callous regard for others, 
however, when it comes to general emotionality, there seems to be little evidence for 
them being truly unemotional individuals.
Within this review, it has been demonstrated that there is a wide disparity within the 
literature regarding the degree to which psychopaths experience many emotions. 
However, with regard to anger, there is a weight of evidence to suggest that 
psychopaths, although able to carry out impulsive acts, may not be able to form the 
kind of deep interpersonal attachments to others, which precipitate strong emotional 
reactions that can lead to some forms of violent offending. This is evidenced by
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many studies, which repeatedly suggest that psychopaths utilise more ‘instrumental’ 
aggression, than emotion based or ‘reactive’ forms of aggression. In addition, with 
regard to anxiety, or fear, in line with Cleckley’s (1941) initial view, a low level of 
anxiety does appear to be a core element of psychopathy, with researchers noting a 
definite deficit in emotional response to fear inducing situations. This finding is 
evidenced by self-report measures, as well as many papers that describe a decreased 
physiological arousal on a range of aversive conditioning paradigms (thought to be 
robust measures o f emotional arousal). Moreover, these findings are supported by the 
cognitive neuroscience literature, which has reported defective areas of neuro- 
anatomical and neuro-hormonal substrata within individuals high in psychopathic 
traits. However, the PCL-R, does not specifically account for levels of anxiety, with 
overall PCL-R scores found to be only negligibly related to indices of trait anxiety 
(Hare, 1991).
With regard to moral and self-conscious emotions, i.e., empathy, sympathy, guilt, 
shame, embarrassment and pride, it seems that far less is known. The limited 
literature surrounding ‘empathy’ within psychopathy suggests that psychopaths are 
able to understand other people’s intentions, emotions and motivations, but due to 
possessing an exclusively cognitive, or callous, form of empathy, they utilize socially 
relevant information entirely for their own gain. Unfortunately, no studies were 
identified that measured the relationship between psychopathy and sympathy, a 
related but qualitatively different emotional state to empathy. Limitations were also 
found in the literature regarding the emotional state of pride, whilst only one study 
had been carried out into the relationship between psychopathy and embarrassment. 
More has been written with regard to remorse, or guilt, but again there were few
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empirical studies that have specifically investigated this emotion to a degree that 
would be informative for clinicians working with psychopathic individuals. The 
literature on shame within psychopathy suggests that there may be evidence of 
psychopaths having an inner sense of shame, though the methodology used within 
the study reporting such claims was questionable, and thus this outcome may need to 
be explored further utilising a more robust research paradigm.
This review has therefore highlighted the need for further exploration into many 
emotional states and their relationship to the etiology and maintenance of 
psychopathy. In looking forward, a greater understanding of the emotional 
capabilities, as well as the deficits of psychopaths will be pertinent in increasing our 
understanding of this disorder, and help those working with individuals high in 
psychopathic traits, in their clinical endeavour to search for effective ways of 
supporting psychopaths to live healthy and productive lives, and thus reduce the risk 
that these individuals pose to society.
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Part 2: Empirical Paper
Perceived social rank, social expectation, shame and general 
emotionality within psychopathy
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Abstract
Objectives: To investigate the self and social evaluative processes of offenders high 
in psychopathic traits.
Background: Previous research (Morrison & Gilbert, 2001) indicates that 
psychopaths may experience higher degrees of internalised shame than previously 
thought. As there were concerns about the method used within this study, the current 
investigation aims to replicate these findings utilising a more stringent methodology. 
Method and Design: The current study utilised a variety of published self-report 
questionnaires, measuring psychopathy (PPI-R), social rank (SCRS), shame (ISS and 
OAS), distress (DASS-21) and general emotionality (DES). Social expectations were 
measured using the Social Expectations Inventory (SEI; Blackburn, Personal 
correspondence). 106 male participants from a large, inner city prison completed the 
test battery.
Results: The current study found significant differences between those defined as 
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ psychopaths, in terms of their self and social evaluative 
processes, specifically with regard to perceived social rank estimate and reported 
levels of shame and distress.
Conclusions: Overall, the proposed relationships between the two subtypes of 
psychopaths were found. The findings of this study highlight the worth of 
considering different treatment approaches for the different subtypes of psychopathy.
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1. Introduction
This paper reports on an investigation into the self and social evaluative processes of 
offenders high in psychopathic traits. Specifically, it considers the role of perceived 
social rank, social expectations, shame, and general emotionality within this criminal 
population. This study will attempt to replicate and extend Morrison and Gilbert’s 
(2001) study, which examined how psychopathic traits relate to shame and social 
rank. In this introductory section some of the main constructs are discussed before an 
outline of the study’s aims and hypotheses are put forward.
1.1 Psychopathy
In 1941, Hervey Cleckley offered one of the first comprehensive descriptions of 
psychopathy outlining how the psychopath differs from the ordinary criminal 
offender in a number of discernible ways. His criteria included behavioural 
components (including a tendency to be unmotivated, antisocial and unreliable), 
affective personality features (including egocentricity or narcissism, and a lack of 
anxiety, remorse or shame) and interpersonal features, (including superficial charm, 
dishonesty, lack of guilt and empathy, and a lack of responsiveness). Another key 
theorist, Benjamin Karpman, distinguished ‘primary’ from ‘secondary’ psychopaths 
(Karpman, 1941, cited in Poythress & Skeem, 2006). He noted that although 
psychopathic individuals are “superficially similar in their propensity toward 
antisocial and criminal behaviour”, primary and secondary subtypes are 
“fundamentally different in their psychopathological underpinnings” (Karpman, 
1941, cited in Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005).
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Since Karpman, many other psychologists have taken up the challenge of 
reclassifying the broad construct of psychopathy into various subtypes (Blackburn, 
1975, 1998; Blackburn & Coid, 1999; Herve, 2007; Hicks, Markon, Patrick, Krueger 
& Newman, 2004; Millon & Davis, 1998). Primary psychopaths are thought to 
display the defining personality characteristics of psychopathy from an early age, 
display low levels of anxiety and to lack prosocial emotions, such as guilt or love. In 
contrast, the hostile behaviour of secondary psychopaths is considered to be a 
product of their negative life experiences and environment (Porter and Woodworth, 
2006). In addition, secondary psychopaths are believed to be able to experience a 
range of social emotions. Blackburn (1998) distinguished between the two subtypes 
in terms of their differing levels of social competence and sociability. He argued that 
primary psychopaths are socially adept and self confident, and as a result display 
little overt anxiety, generally perceiving themselves as being socially dominant. 
Secondary psychopaths, on the other hand, are characterized by emotional 
disturbance, social anxiety, low self-esteem, submissiveness and social withdrawal. 
Within their study, Morrison & Gilbert (2001) chose to utilize the ‘primary’ versus 
‘secondary’ psychopathy distinction.
1.2 Social rank
Hierarchical social structures exist throughout the animal kingdom and have 
important implications for access to resources, reproductive opportunities and 
alliances. Within these systems, dominance may be attained either through alliances 
and/or through ‘ritual agonistic behaviour’ (Allan & Gilbert, 1997). Ritual agonistic 
behaviour refers to the symbolization of fighting behaviour that serves as a signaling 
function. It includes, ‘dominance display’, that is aggressive displays to others,
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’threat display’ towards an individual, ‘attack and escape behaviours’ and 
‘submissive display’ (Sloman & Price, 1987). Sturman and Mongrain (2008) note 
that ritual agonistic behaviour also serves to prevent serious injury or death. For 
example, threat displays are terminated by submissive acts that signal that one is not 
a competitor for status or resources. This subordinate, or yielding mechanism has 
come to be known as the Involuntary Subordinate Strategy (Allan & Gilbert, 1997; 
Gardner & Price, 1999; Sloman, Price, Gilbert, & Gardner, 1994) and more recently 
as the Involuntary Defeat Strategy (IDS; Gilbert, 2000; Sloman, 2000). Sloman, 
Gilbert, and Hasey (2003) posit that the IDS prompts flight or submissive behaviour 
after a defeat and, insofar as the individual has been able to escape, obtain help or 
accept a new social standing, the IDS will have been effective in preventing further 
losses.
Kalma (1991) notes that humans are highly sensitive and responsive to rank related 
social threat signals, with verbal and non verbal signals of disapproval, criticism and 
ridicule perceived as attacks on status, personal attractiveness and acceptability 
(Gilbert, 1997). Social rank theory (Gilbert, 1989) posits that personal perceptions of 
one’s social rank affect a range of social behaviours and affects. For example, 
criticism, social put down, perceived social rank and styles of blame have been found 
to play a major role in shame (Gilbert & Miles, 2000; Goss, Gilbert, & Allan, 1994). 
Anger often arises as a result of threats to status, by way of feeling shamed or 
criticised (Tangney, Hill-Barlow, Wagner, Marschall, Borenstein, Sanftner, Mor & 
Gramzow, 1996). There is good evidence that social rank also plays an important 
role in the expression of aggressive behaviour, (Ray & Sapolsky, 1992; Sapolsky,
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1990; Scott, 1990). Thus, aggressive attacks and threats tend to flow down the social 
rank (from dominant to subordinate) more frequently, than up it (Toates, 1995).
1.2.1 Social comparison
In humans, social comparisons are used extensively and incorporate sophisticated 
judgements relating to ‘social attractiveness’. Allan and Gilbert (1995, 1997) 
suggested that through comparison of 1) rank, 2) social attractiveness and 3) the 
degree to which one is either an insider or an outsider, individuals find their place in 
a social hierarchy. Taken together, these three dimensions are interpreted as 
‘perceived status’ and are implicated in the activation of the involuntary domination, 
as well as the subordination mechanisms, mentioned above. In cognitive terms, 
dominance hierarchies constitute a set of social norms that reflect which behaviours 
are permitted, prohibited, or obligated given one’s rank (Cummins, 1999; Gilbert & 
Allan, 1994). Allan and Gilbert’s (1995) formulation of social comparison has been 
linked to submissiveness, hostility, depression and other mental disorders. In order to 
maintain priority of access to resources, dominant individuals monitor the behaviour 
of subordinates and aggress against those who “cheat”, that is, those who violate 
social norms and/or expectations. An implication of this analysis is that higher- 
ranking individuals are more likely to detect cheating in lower-ranking individuals 
than vice versa, (Cummins, 1999).
1.2.2 Social Rank and Status Attack in Psychopathy
Relatively few empirical studies have been carried out into the role of social 
presentations, rank and status attack within psychopathy. Of the limited literature that 
does exist, the general view is that psychopaths assume that they are dominant, or
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‘high ranking’ in social comparative terms, and expect others to treat them as such, 
(Blackburn & Renwick, 1996; Blackburn, 1998; Blackburn & Coid, 1999; Hare 
1991; Morrison & Gilbert, 2001). Psychopaths appear to hold positive self-schemas 
and experience high self-esteem (Morrison & Gilbert, 2001) and as a result do not 
expect others to be antagonistic towards them (Blackburn, 1998). However, the 
research literature regarding ‘secondary’ psychopaths, suggests that, unlike primary 
psychopaths, they are particularly sensitive to threats against their social standing 
(Blackburn, 1998; Blackburn & Coid, 1999). Differences between these two 
subtypes of psychopaths, have also been found with regard to their sensitivity to 
social put downs, with secondary psychopaths being far more sensitive than primary 
psychopaths (Morrison & Gilbert, 2001). In addition, counter to Toates’ (1995) 
finding within a normal population, that aggressive attacks and threats tend to be 
more strongly associated with perceptions of higher social rank, a significant inverse 
relationship has been reported between social rank and anger within psychopathy 
(Morrison & Gilbert, 2001). The following study will therefore investigate whether 
those offenders high in traits that have traditionally defined the psychopath, that is 
those that are associated more with what Blackburn (1998) defines as the ‘primary 
psychopath’, report specific social expectations that stem from an evaluation of their 
social rank status.
1.3 Shame
The self-conscious emotion of shame is considered to be “a powerful, affective 
experience related to negative self-evaluation (self as inadequate, flawed, bad and 
inferior), beliefs that others see the self unfavourably, and strong desires to conceal 
the self’ (Morrison & Gilbert, 2001). It has been described as an egocentric, or self­
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focused, experience where the individual, immersed in a moment of shame, is more 
concerned with the implications of their perceived transgression for themselves, than 
for others (Tangney and Dealing, 2002). Shame is viewed as a “debilitating, negative 
emotion, marked by feelings of inferiority, powerlessness and self-consciousness” 
(Tangney, Miller, Flicker and Barlow, 1996).
Gilbert (1997, 1998a, 1998b) has argued that there is a need to distinguish between 
two forms of shame, ‘internal shame’, that is, a negative feeling that a person holds 
about themselves, and ‘external shame’, a negative feeling that a person thinks others 
hold about them. External shame relates to a sense of failing to meet externalized 
standards, whilst the degree to which external shame is experienced is thought to be 
dependent on how important others’ views are to the self (Goss, Gilbert & Allan, 
1994). Consequently, the experience of external shame appears to be affected by 
social expectations, as well as cognitions about the value of others’ judgments; whilst 
internal shame concerns the idea of the self judging the self (Tarrier, Wells and 
Haddock, 1998) and pertains to a sense of failing to meet internalized standards.
Gilbert (1997) asserts that levels of internal and external shame are not necessarily 
interrelated, but instead vary across two unrelated continua. For example, a person 
may feel no distress or anxiety about their failings or flaws (unaffected by internal 
shame) unless they expect that these might be revealed (affected by external shame) 
(Lewis, 1992). An example of this might be that of an offender who understands that 
other people disapprove of their criminal activities, and on considering this feels 
deeply uncomfortable, but in the absence of judging others, does not experience any 
degree of internal shame.
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1.3.1 Shame and Psychopathy
There is growing evidence that shame is associated with many psychopathologies 
(Gilbert, 1992, 1997), but given that it has always been reported that psychopaths see 
themselves as superior to others and feel little empathy or remorse (Hare, 1991,
1993), many psychologists had assumed that shame did not played a significant role 
in the development or perpetuation of psychopathic disorders. However, Gudjonsson 
and Roberts (1983) found that secondary psychopaths have higher levels of shame 
and guilt than primary psychopaths. In building on this finding Morrison and Gilbert 
(2001) again asked participants from a population of male offenders to rate their 
perceptions of internalized shame (shame proneness). They found that both ‘primary’ 
and ‘secondary’ psychopaths showed comparatively high levels of internalised 
shame when compared with non-psychopaths (Morrison & Gilbert, 2001). Of note, 
the difference was only significant for secondary psychopaths, but nonetheless an 
elevation on a measure of shame was somewhat unexpected given the dominant 
views of primary psychopaths as having a ‘deficient affective response’ (Cleckley, 
1976; Hare, 1980, 1991), specifically for moral or self-conscious emotions. As a 
result of their study, Morrison and Gilbert (2001) concluded that psychopaths, 
particularly ‘secondary’ psychopaths appear to have an inner sense of shame such 
that “there is a feeling that, in truth, there is something flawed, bad or worthless 
about oneself’, though they are able to hold this view whilst maintaining a 
perception of themselves as being superior to others, e.g. “I may not be that good 
myself, but I’m still better than other people”, suggesting that psychopaths are more 
concerned with attempting to live up to their own personal standards than concerned 
with what others may think of them. More recently, Wastell and Booth (2006) have 
found Machiavellianism (a strong tendency to manipulate others for personal gain - a
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trait typically associated with psychopathy) to be positively associated with shame 
proneness (internal shame), but negatively associated with guilt proneness.
1.4 Psychopathy and Other Emotions
With the exception of anxiety or fear and anger, emotionality within psychopathy has 
been poorly researched, with only a handful of empirical studies exploring the 
capabilities of psychopaths to experience the other basic emotions (Blair, Sellars, 
Strickland, Clark, Williams, Smith, & Jones, 1995). It is believed that even less is 
known about the degree to which psychopaths might experience the many moral and 
self-conscious emotions, such as empathy, sympathy and guilt, or shame, 
embarrassment and pride. Of the literature that has been produced, some authors 
have concluded that psychopaths are cognitively able to understand a range of both 
positive and negative emotions, but appear to lack the ability to really ‘feel’ or 
experience many of these affective states for themselves (Book, Quinsey, & 
Langford, 2007). However, in line with the literature that is available, we might 
expect that those individuals high in psychopathic traits would, in the main, 
experience positive emotions given that they do not show a tendency to experience 
high levels of anger (Cleckley, 1976) guilt (Hare, 1980, 1991) depression, anxiety or 
stress (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005).
The following research will therefore attempt to investigate whether those with a 
psychopathic personality type have a particular propensity to experience a range of 
emotions to varying degrees. In doing so, it may be possible to assess whether 
psychopaths report predictable patterns of thinking, behaving and feeling. This idea 
has a basis in a cognitive behavioural framework, but is also supported by Izard,
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Libero, Putnam and Haynes’ (1993) work into emotion-personality relations, which 
has shown that emotions and dimensions of temperament and personality are closely 
related.
1.5 The Present Study
This study aims to extend previous research on personality, social cognition and 
social rank theory, in those people with a psychopathic personality type. It aims to 
explore how those high in psychopathic traits differ from those low in psychopathic 
traits in terms of their perceived social rank, their reported levels of internal and 
external shame, their expectations about others, and the degree to which they 
experience certain emotions.
In advancing the work of Morrison and Gilbert (2001), one criticism of their study is 
that they used the 1983 Mental Health Act legal classification of ‘psychopathic 
disorder’ to identify, from their chosen sample of mentally disordered offenders, who 
were more likely to have a psychopathic personality. As this classification is a legal 
definition, it has only limited clinical relevance and is therefore an invalid and 
unreliable method for sampling this population. In an attempt to refine their sample, 
as stated previously, Morrison and Gilbert (2001) further categorized their sample 
into ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ psychopathic subtypes. This was achieved by using 
the Antisocial Personality Questionnaire (APQ; Blackburn and Fawcett, 1996). 
However, unlike other self-report measures of psychopathy, namely the Levenson 
Primary and Secondary Psychopathy Scales (Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995), 
or the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; Lilienfeld, & Andrews, 1996; and 
PPI-Revised; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005), the APQ was not designed to be a
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measure of psychopathy per se, but rather a measure of generalized antisociality and 
deviance (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). As a result, it is believed that the APQ may be 
insensitive to the specific traits associated with psychopathic personality, and 
therefore it remains possible that a more robust measure of psychopathy may have 
produced different results. The present study will therefore first attempt to assess 
whether the Morrison and Gilbert (2001) finding of shame proneness can be 
replicated within a sample that is more representative of those with a psychopathic 
personality. Then, if indeed there is some evidence of shame playing a role within 
psychopathy, as suggested by Morrison and Gilbert, (2001), it will explore whether 
there is any evidence that psychopaths’ ‘internalised’ versus their ‘externalised’ 
shame levels differ.
In the following study psychopathy will again be measured using a self-report 
questionnaire. This methodology was chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
although it is acknowledged that Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; 
Hare 1991) is considered to be the gold standard in assessing psychopathy, there are 
pragmatic obstacles in using it within research. Firstly, the PCL-R is notoriously 
difficult to administer and requires extensive training to achieve adequate inter-rater 
reliability. Secondly, the structured interview with the patient/participant typically 
requires anything upwards of 90 minutes to complete, whilst for the scoring to be 
valid the clinician/researcher would need to be able to access high quality file data in 
order to corroborate or amend evidence collected within the initial interview. Due to 
these concerns employing a self-report measure seemed to be a more feasible way to 
access and obtain the amount of data required for this study. After a careful 
assessment of the psychometric tools available in the area, Lilienfeld and Widows’
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(2005) Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Revised (PPI-R) was chosen as the 
measure of psychopathy within this study. The PPI-R, unlike many other widely used 
measures of psychopathy, including the Psychopathic Deviate (Pd) scale of the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI; Hathaway & McKinley, 
1943), and the Socialization Scale (So) of the California Psychological Inventory 
(CPI, Gough, 1957), has repeatedly been shown to have good psychometric 
properties, including strong construct validity, reliability and predictive utility 
(Derefinko & Lynam, 2006; Edens, Poythress, & Watkins, 2001; Lilienfeld & 
Andrews, 1996; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005; Lynam & Derefinko, 2006), (although 
it is acknowledged that the measure has yet to be used extensively in the UK). In 
addition, the PPI-R has been found to correlate with the PCL-R (Benning, Patrick, 
Hicks, Blonogen and Krueger, 2003; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005), yet unlike the 
PCL-R, it also provides indexes of the lower order (specific) traits of psychopathy, 
for example, lack of empathy and fearlessness (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005).
A factor analysis carried out by Benning, et al., (2003) found two largely orthogonal 
PPI factors, the first termed “Fearless dominance”, the second “Impulsive 
Antisociality”. The two factors were described as paralleling the traits associated 
with Factor 1 and 2 or the PCL-R, in that the first factor describes largely emotional- 
interpersonal components of psychopathy, whilst the second is associated with the 
antisocial deviant behavioural features of the disorder. In addition, Benning et a l 
(2003) reported that both Factor 1 of the PCL-R, as well as Factor 1 of the PPI-R, 
describes a trait configuration that fits well with conceptualisations of the ‘primary 
psychopath’. As a result of Benning et al.’s (2003) analysis, within the following 
study the factor scores of the PPI-R will be used to attempt to replicate the findings
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of Morrison and Gilbert (2001) as well as consider any other differences between the 
two subtypes o f ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ psychopathy.
Based on the empirical findings and theoretical underpinnings discussed above, it is 
specifically hypothesised that:
1.6 Hypotheses
1. Social rank and shame, as well as social rank and anger, should be negatively 
correlated (Allan, Gilbert, & Goss, 1994; Morrison & Gilbert, 2001).
2. Perceived social rank should be positively correlated with positive social 
expectations (Cummins, 1999).
3. Those individuals that achieve high scores on Factor 1 of the PPI-R, that is 
those with fearless and dominant traits, should perceive themselves as being 
of high social standing (rank), and generally have an outlook on life that 
reflects superiority over others (Blackburn & Renwick, 1996; Blackburn, 
1998; Blackburn & Coid, 1999; Hare, 1991; Morrison & Gilbert, 2001).
4. Those individuals that score highly on Factor 1 of the PPI-R, should be less 
susceptible to experiencing high levels of depression, anxiety or stress 
(Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005).
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5. Those individuals that score highly on Factor 1 of the PPI-R should hold 
positive self-schemas and experience high self-esteem (Morrison & Gilbert, 
2001).
6. Those individuals that score highly on Factor 1 of the PPI-R should 
experience low levels of both internal and external shame (Hare, 1991; 
Morrison & Gilbert, 2001).
7. Those individuals that score highly on Factor 1 of the PPI-R should not 
expect others to be antagonistic towards them, but instead will expect others 
to be unassured and trusting (Blackburn, 1998).
8. Those individuals that score highly on Factor 1 of the PPI-R should, in the 
main, experience positive emotions. In particular, they should not show a 
tendency to experience high levels of anger (Cleckley, 1976) or guilt (Hare, 
1980, 1991).
9. Those individuals that score highly on Factor 2 of the PPI-R, that is those 
with impulsive antisocial traits, should experience high levels of guilt 
(Gudjonsson & Roberts, 1983) and shame (Blackburn & Fawcett, 1996), as 
well as anger, which is thought to be particularly related to status attack 
(Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; Morrison & Gilbert, 2001).
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2. Method
2.1 Participants
All participants were English-speaking, male prisoners. Participants were recruited 
from a large, inner-city prison. Participants were invited to take part in a study 
investigating their personality, their emotions, the way in which they thought about 
themselves in relation to others, and their expectations of others. In terms of 
inclusion criteria, prisoners had: 1) to have an ability to read and comprehend written 
English, 2) to have an ability to concentrate for approximately one hour, and 3) to be 
able to give their informed consent to participate in the study. An information sheet 
was offered to all prisoners, whilst a signed consent form was obtained from all 
participants (see Appendices). The study was granted ethical approval from the UCL 
research ethics committee and the prison research committee (see Appendices).
2.2 Design
This study employed a within subjects design. The independent variable was 
psychopathy (as measured on the PPI-R), whilst the dependent variables were social 
rank status (as measured on the Social Comparison Rating Scale), social expectations 
(as measured on the Social Expectations Inventory), internal shame (as measured by 
the Internalised Shame Scale), external shame (as measured by the Others as Shamer 
Scale), emotionality (as measured on the Differential Emotion Scale), and schemata 
(as measured on the Brief Core Schema Scale).
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2.3 Measures
Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Revised (PPI-R: Lilienfeld & Widows. 2005)
The PPI-R is a 154-item trait-based measure of psychopathy, which is intended to 
reflect the personality traits associated with the disorder. Items are responded to on a 
4-point, Likert-type scale (l=False, 4= True). The PPI-R includes validity scales to 
identify defensiveness, malingering and inconsistent responding. The PPI-R has eight 
personality subscales including, ‘Machiavellian Egocentricity’, ‘Social Influence’, 
‘Fearlessness’, ‘Coldheartedness’, ‘Rebellious Nonconformity’, ‘Blame 
Extemalisation’, ‘Carefree Nonplanfulness’ and ‘Stress Immunity’. Three, largely 
orthogonal, factor scores, the first termed “Fearless dominance”, (incorporating the 
subscales of ‘Social Influence’, ‘Fearlessness’ and ‘Stress Immunity’), the second 
“Impulsive antisociality” (incorporating the subscales of ‘Machiavellian 
Egocentricity’, ‘Rebellious Nonconformity’, ‘Blame Extemalisation’ and ‘Carefree 
Nonplanfulness’), the third, “Coldheartedness” (including the subscale of 
‘Coldheartedness’ only) can be computed from the PPI-R scores. The first factor, 
which describes largely emotional-interpersonal components of psychopathy, and 
according to Benning et al (2003) fits well with conceptualisations of the ‘primary 
psychopath’ will be used within this study. In addition, the second factor score, 
associated with the antisocial deviant behavioural features of the disorder, will also 
be used within this study. However, the third factor score, which derives from the 
subscale of ‘Coldheartedness’ alone, will not be explored within the current research. 
The PPI-R has shown high test-retest reliability (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005), good 
internal validity (Cronbach’s alpha from .90 to .93 for the total score) and has been 
validated as a measure of psychopathy when the PCL-R was the criterion (Derefinko 
& Lynam, 2006; Sandoval, Hancock, Poythress, Edens, & Lilienfeld, 2000).
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The Social Comparison Rating Scale (SCRS: Allan & Gilbert. 1995) -  as social rank 
estimate
This is an 11-item scale designed to measure how people perceive themselves in 
relation to others (Allan & Gilbert, 1995). According to Gilbert, Price and Allan, 
(1995) estimates of social standing and rank can be taken from measures of social 
comparison. The test assesses the three principal dimensions of social comparison: 
‘Relative Inferiority’ (or general rank); ‘Attractiveness’ and ‘Group-fit’, by 
measuring a person’s rating of their relative social rank. The SCRS employs a 
semantic differential methodology (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957), in which 
participants are asked to make a global social comparison of themselves in relation to 
others by considering the statement: ‘In relation to others, I generally feel...’ 
followed by a series of bipolar constructs. Constructs include, inferior-superior, 
untalented-more talented, undesirable-more desirable, and unconfident and more 
confident. Each item is rated on a 10-point Likert scale. High scores represent 
favourable social comparisons whilst low scores determine unfavourable 
comparisons. The measure has exhibited a high degree of internal reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha of .88; Allan & Gilbert, 1995) and is significantly negatively 
correlated with several types of psychopathology, including depression, both in 
clinical and student groups (Allan & Gilbert, 1995).
The Social Expectations Inventory (SEI) Blackburn (Personal Correspondence)
The SEI is a 32-item trait-based measure of social expectations. Participants are 
asked to consider, ‘In your everyday dealing with others, to what degree do you 
expect people to ...’ avoid you, admit you are right in an argument, confide in you, 
etc. Participants are asked to state the regularity of the above items on a 6-point
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Likert-type scale, with responses ranging from “never” to “usually or always”. The 
inventory consists of three subscales, ‘Antagonistic’, ‘Trusting’ and ‘Unassured’. 
Although the SEI has not been published, Blackburn (Personal communication) has 
provided data showing good psychometric properties for the measure. For example, 
the first two of the three subscales noted above have exhibited a high degree of 
internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha of .90 and .83 respectively, N=114; Blackburn, 
personal communication). However, it should be noted that the last subscale, 
‘Unassured’, showed only a moderate degree of internal validity (Cronbach’s alpha 
of .55) so will be utilised within the current study with some degree of caution. For a 
copy of the measure see Appendices.
The Internalized Shame Scale (ISS: Cook. 1988, 1994)
The ISS is a 30-item trait-based measure, developed from Kaufman’s (1989) 
construct of internalized shame. Twenty-four of the items form the ‘Shame’ scale, 
with the remainder consisting of positive items from Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale, 
(Rosenberg, 1965). Participants were asked to state the regularity with which they 
experienced particular thoughts or feelings, on a 5-point Likert-type scale, with 
responses ranging from “never” to “almost always”. The measure has high internal 
consistency and test re-test reliability (Goss, Gilbert & Allan, 1994). In addition, 
correlations with other emotions that are theoretically linked with shame have been 
found to be significant, as measured by an affect checklist (Rybak & Brown, 1996). 
Overall the ISS is considered to be a measure of internal shame, although it is 
acknowledged that a small proportion of the items also relate to external shame.
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The Other as Shamer Scale (OAS: Goss, Gilbert & Allan. 1994)
As an adaptation of the Internalized Shame Scale, the OAS scale was created as a 
trait-based measure o f external shame. Within this study, the OAS was used in order 
to obtain global judgements o f how people think others view them. The measure 
consists of 18 items. Respondents are asked to indicate the frequency of their 
feelings and experiences to items such as, “ I feel other people see me as not good 
enough” , and “ I think that other people look down on me” , on a 5-point Likert scale 
(0-4). The scale produces a total score, as well as three subscale scores, ‘inferior’, 
‘emptiness’ and ‘how others behave when they see me make mistakes’. This trait- 
based measure has been shown to have good psychometric properties (Goss et al.,
1994) and correlates significantly with other measures of shame, such as the 
Internalized Shame Scale (r = .81, Goss et. al., 1994). In their study, Goss et a l 
(1994) found this scale to have a Cronbach’s alpha of .92.
The Brief Core Schema Scale (BCSS: Fowler. Freeman. Smith. Kuivers. Bebbinston. 
Bashforth, et al., 2006)
The BCSS has 24 items concerning beliefs about the self and others that are assessed 
on a 5-point rating scale (0-4). Four scores are obtained: negative-self (six items), 
positive- self (six items), negative-others (six items) and positive-others (six items). 
The participant is asked to indicate, in a dichotomous No/Yes format, whether they 
hold each belief. Then, if they indicate that they do hold the belief they are asked to 
indicate the strength of their belief conviction by circling a number from 1 to 4 (1 = 
believe it slightly, 2 = believe it moderately, 3 = believe it very much, 4 = believe it 
totally). The scale has achieved good psychometric properties, both in terms of 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha of .78 and .86 for positive and negative self
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schemas respectively, and .88 and .88 for the positive and negative other schemas 
respectively) and test-retest reliability (Pearson’s r = 0.84, p<0.001) (Fowler et al., 
2006).
The Differential Emotions Scale. Fourth edition (DES-IV: Izard. Libero. Putnam & 
Haynes. 1993)
The DES is a multi-scale, trait-based measure of twelve separate emotions. The 
emotions measured by the DES are interest, joy, surprise, sadness, anger, disgust, 
contempt, fear, shame, shyness, guilt and hostility directed toward the self. 
Participants are asked to respond on a 5-point frequency scale (1= rarely or never to 
5=very often) to the question, “In your daily life, how often do you feel...”. The 
measure has 36 items. Several studies have contributed evidence for the construct 
validity of the DES, (Blumberg & Izard, 1985; Fridland, Schwarzt, & Fowler, 1984, 
cited in Izard, Libero, Putnam & Haynes, 1993). In their study, Izard, et al., (1993) 
reported Cronbach’s alpha scores ranging from .56 for disgust, through to .85 for the 
anger and sadness scales.
The Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (PASS: Lovibond & Lovibond. 1995)
The DASS-21 is a state-based measure of depressive symptoms, physical anxiety 
(fear) and mental stress (nervous tension), and was used to ascertain the level of 
current distress within the participant group. The full DASS has 41 items, but the 
short version contains 21 items, 7 per subscale. The items are measured on a 4-point 
scale ranging from 0, “did not apply to me” to 3 “applied to me very much, or most 
of the time”. Higher scores denote less favourable conditions. Participants are asked 
to use the 4-point severity/frequency scales to rate the extent to which they have
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experienced each state over the past week. The DASS-21 has the same factor 
structure and gives similar results to the full DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). In 
addition, it has been shown to have excellent internal consistency gaining 
Cronbach’s alphas of .94 for depression, .87 for anxiety and .91 for stress (Antony, 
Beiling Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998).
2.4 Procedure
Prisoners were recruited using two methods. Some participants responded, via a 
prison officer or member of the healthcare team, to posters displayed throughout the 
prison, whilst many were approached directly on the wings, during social periods, 
and invited to participate. On meeting with potential participants, the researcher 
explained the purpose of the study and participants were given an Information Sheet 
(see Appendices). Questions were invited before written consent was obtained. The 
psychometric batteries were left with the participant to complete during “lock up”, a 
period of approximately two hours in their cell, which incorporated the lunch hour. 
On completion, questionnaires were collected and participants were given the 
opportunity to ask any questions or discuss any issues that may have arisen from 
completing the measures. In order to minimise any comprehension difficulties, given 
the degree of literacy problems amongst the offending population, participants were 
invited to leave blank any questions that they did not understand for later 
clarification and completion with the help of the researcher.
2.5 Power Analysis
Given the results reported by Morrison & Gilbert (2001) regarding the differences of 
two groups (psychopaths and non-psychopaths) on the social rank measure, a power
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calculation was performed using the Zumastat Version 2.3 software. Using the means 
and standard deviations reported to estimate the effect size, it was found that 55 
participants per group would be needed (total sample =110) in order to achieve a 
power level of .80, at alpha < .05 level of statistical significance.
However, as this study was not intending to split the data set into two groups, but 
rather analyse multiple continuous variables, an alternative method of estimating the 
sample size was used in addition. In order to carry out a meaningful regression 
analysis, a graph constructed by Miles and Shevlin (2001) was used to estimate the 
sample size required to achieve a power level of .80. Given an expected medium 
effect size, and that a relatively large number of predictors (up to 6 variables) would 
be used within the regression analysis, it was predicted that a sample size of 
approximately 100 participants would be required.
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3. Results
3.1 Description o f  Sample
One hundred and six participants agreed to take part in the study. The mean age of 
the cohort was 35 years old (range = 21 to 65 years). Seventy (66%) offenders were 
British, (51 white British, 14 black British, 5 Black/White British). Of the remainder, 
twelve (11%) were European, including Irish, ten (9%) originated from the 
Caribbean, seven (7%) described themselves as Asian, five (5%) as African and two 
(2%) originated from North America. With regard to offending behaviour the sub­
categories described within Item 20: ‘Criminal Versatility’ of the PCL-R (Hare, 
1991) were used to subdivide the sample according to their index offences. For a 
breakdown of these see Table 1. With regard to the four participants that were being 
detained for crimes that fell under the ‘Miscellaneous’ category, this included driving 
offences, violation of immigration laws, trespass and affray (PCL-R equivalent of 
‘causing a disturbance’ and/or ‘vandalism’). The remaining four (4%) participants 
did not provide any information about their offending behaviour. In addition, five 
(5%) participants did not provide any information about their current sentence status.
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Table 1. Background variables for the sample (N=106)
Background variables Sample (N=106) N (%)
Age 34.97 s.d. 9.589
Ethnicity/Culture
British 70 (66)
Non British 36 (34)
Index Offence
‘Assault’ 15 (14)
‘Robbery’ 12 (11)
‘Theft’ 11 (12)
‘Possession of a weapon’ 10 (9)
‘Drug offences’ 8 (8)
‘Murder’ 7 (7)
‘Arson’ 4 (4)
‘Sex offence’ 3 (3)
‘Kidnapping’ 3 (3)
‘Fraud’ 2 (2)
‘Escape’ 2 (2)
‘Obstruction of justice’ 2 (2)
‘Major driving offence’ 1 (1)
‘Miscellaneous’ 4 (4)
Sentence type
Pre-Sentence/Remand 33 (31)
Post Sentence 67 (63)
Civil Prisoner -  Awaiting Deportation 1 (1)
3.2. Preliminary Analysis
All variables were examined for accuracy of data entry, missing values and 
appropriateness for parametric testing prior to statistical analysis. All data was 
examined for its suitability for parametric statistical analysis. With regard to the PPI- 
R measure, fourteen participant’s data was deleted due to unsatisfactory scores on the 
Inconsistent Responding (15-item) validity scale (IR15) of this measure. However, it 
was decided that only data relating to the PPI-R would be deleted from the dataset, as 
after eyeballing the remaining data for each of the fifteen cases, there was nothing to 
suggest that participants had responded in a similarly fashion towards the other 
measures. In addition, as the other measures did not have similar validity scales it 
was not possible to establish, through any reliable means, whether or not a similar 
problematic response style had unduly influenced the acquired data. Finally, it
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remained possible that the PPI-R measure, more so than any other, would have been 
at risk of an inconsistent responding style, as it represented the largest section within 
the test battery, containing 154-items as opposed to 36-items, which was the next 
largest section.
Transformations and Outliers
A total of eight transformations were carried out on the data in order to achieve 
normality. The SCRS (social rank estimate) data was negatively skewed (skewness = 
4.14), however, after a square root transformation skewness fell within acceptable 
limits (0.18). In addition, data for the measure of SEI ‘Unassured’ (Social 
expectations), OAS ‘Emptiness’ (external shame), DASS ‘total’ (distress), BCSS 
‘Negative Self (schemas), and DES ‘Fear’, ‘Shyness’ and ‘Hostility Inwards’ were 
positively skewed. Normality was again achieved due to square root transformations 
being performed on the data (see Table 2). No variables had significant kurtosis.
There were four outlier scores in the total data set. One was present within the data 
relating to the PPI-R subscale of ‘Stress Immunity’, another was present within the 
SEI subscale of ‘Unassured’, yet another within the data for the measure of SCRS, 
whilst the final one presented itself within the data relevant to the BCSS subscale 
‘Negative Self. All outliers were removed from the dataset.
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Table 2. Skewness statistics for all measures, including post-transformations, where 
applicable______________________________________________________________
Aspect Being 
Measured
Measure
Skewness
Pre
T ransformation
Post 
T ransformation 
(If applicable)
Psychopathy PPI-R (Total score) 0.59
PPI-R (Factor 1) 0.11
PPI-R (Factor 2) 0.28
1 PPI-R (ME) 1.96
2PPI-R (RN) 1.65
3PPI-R (BE) 0.54
4PPI-R (CN) 0.31
5PPI-R (SOI) 0.82
6PPI-R (F) 0.29
7PPI-R (STI) 1.74
8PPI-R (C) 1.80
Social Rank SCRS (Total Score) 4.14 0.18
Social SEI (Antagonistic) 1.57
Expectation SEI (Trusting) 1.13
SEI (Unassured) 2.51 1.30
Shame (External) OAS (Total Score) 1.67
OAS (Inferior) 1.41
OAS (Emptiness) 2.41 0.65
OAS (How others behave...) 1.76
Shame (Internal) ISS (Shame) 0.52
ISS (Self esteem) 2.07
Schemata BCSC (Neg. Self) 3.34 0.79
BCSC (Pos Self) 1.12
BCSC (Neg. Other) 1.93
BCSC (Pos. Other) 0.68
Emotionality DES (Interest) 0.69
(General) DES (Enjoyment) 1.43
DES (Surprise) 1.14
DES (Sadness) 0.81
DES (Anger) 0.76
DES (Disgust) 0.43
DES (Contempt) 0.02
DES (Fear) 3.01 1.23
DES (Guilt) 0.95
DES (Shame) 1.99
DES (Shyness) 2.94 1.04
DES (Self-Hostility) 2.60 0.97
Distress DASS21 (Total) 2.40 0.57
1 PPI-R: Machiavellian Egocentricity Subscale
2 PPI-R: Rebellious Nonconformity Subscale
3 PPI-R: Blame Extemalisation Subscale
4 PPI-R: Carefree Nonplanfulness Subscale
5 PPI-R: Social Influence Subscale
6 PPI-R: Fearlessness Subscale 
PPI-R: Stress Immunity Subscale
8 PPI-R: Coldheartedness Subscale
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Questionnaire Measures
As many of the measures used within this study were developed with non-offender 
populations, means and standard deviations from the current study are placed in the 
context of previously published norms for each of the questionnaire measures in 
order to help the reader see how the current sample’s performance on the various 
measures compares with the samples that the tests were standardized on.
Psychopathy
PPI-R (Lilienfeld & Widows. 2005)
Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for the PPI-R. Lilienfeld and 
Widows’ (2005) norms for an American offender population are shown in 
parentheses within this table. As illustrated, the majority of the means for 
participants in the present study were higher than those reported by Lilienfeld and 
Widows (2005) indicating that the general level of psychopathy reported within this 
sample is somewhat higher than that observed within the American cohort. Of note, 
the Stress Immunity Subscale mean score and the total score mean are markedly 
different from that reported by Lilienfeld and Widows (2005). This is thought to be 
due to a typographical error within the PPI-R manual, (Lilienfeld, Private 
correspondence) as the means for these indices within this sample are more inline 
with all other reported sample means within the PPI-R manual (Lilienfeld and 
Widows, 2005) and within other means within this study.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the psychopathy measure (PPI-R)
Aspect being Measure Mean Standard Deviation
Measured
Psychopathy PPI-R (Total score) 308.46 (283.86)* 31.87 (28.99)
PPI-R (Factor 1) 119.50 (DNA) 16.33 (DNA)
PPI-R (Factor 2) 158.03 (DNA) 24.18 (DNA)
1 PPI-R (ME) 44.13 (38.38) 9.91 (10.10)
2PPI-R (RN) 34.59 (27.26) 8.04 (6.84)
3PPI-R (BE) 41.35 (34.00) 7.91 (8.51)
4PPI-R (CN) 37.47 (33.45) 8.95 (8.62)
5PPI-R (SOI) 47.64 (48.48) 7.89 (7.92)
6PPI-R (F) 37.28 (30.64) 9.73 (7.60)
7PPI-R (STI) 34.65 (12.86)* 6.61 (6.50)
8PPI-R (C) 31.35 (33.02) 8.27 (8.39)
9PPI-R (VR) 30.28 (32.24) 5.43 (5.87)
10PPI-R (DR) 15.65 (12.86) 4.25 (3.24)
nPPI-R (IR15) 11.37 (11.58) 4.59 (4.62)
Note: Published norms for offender sample shown in parentheses, from Lilienfeld & Widows
(2005). DNA = Data not available within published study. * = Possible typographical error 
within PPI-R manual (Lilienfeld, Private correspondence).
Means and standard deviations for each of the remaining measures used within this 
study are presented within Table 4. Again, current means and standard deviations are 
placed in the context of previously published norms for each of the questionnaire 
measures.
1 PPI-R: Machiavellian Egocentricity Subscale
2 PPI-R: Rebellious Nonconformity Subscale
3 PPI-R: Blame Extemalisation Subscale
4 PPI-R: Carefree Nonplanfulness Subscale
5 PPI-R: Social Influence Subscale
6 PPI-R: Fearlessness Subscale
7 PPI-R: Stress Immunity Subscale
8 PPI-R: Coldheartedness Subscale
9 PPI-R: Virtuous Responding Validity scale
10 PPI-R: Deviant Responding Validity scale
11 PPI-R: Inconsistent Responding (15-items) Validity scale
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for all other measures
Aspect being Measure Mean Standard
Measured Deviation
Social Rank SCRS (Total Score) 68.32 (68.04)1 18.44 (16.59)1
Social SEI (Antagonistic) 23.53 (24.34)2 11.73 (10.96)2
Expectation SEI (Trusting) 18.96 (25.49)2 6.03 (7.37)2
SEI (Unassured) 17.18 (9.03)2 5.03 (3.44)2
Shame (External) OAS (Total Score) 43.85 (20.00)3 15.29 (10.10)3
OAS (Inferior) 16.61 (DNA)3 6.38 (DNA)3
OAS (Emptiness) 8.79 (DNA)3 3.83 (DNA)3
OAS (How others behave...) 16.03 (DNA)3 5.66 (DNA)3
Shame (Internal) ISS (Shame) 38.96 (33.98)4 21.74 (15.52)4
ISS (Self esteem) 15.16 (DNA)4 4.62 (DNA)4
Schemata BCSC (Neg. Self) 4.84 (3.55)5 4.50 (3.55)5
BCSC (Pos Self) 12.27 (10.20)5 6.14 (4.23)5
BCSC (Neg. Other) 8.06 (4.07)5 10.18 (4.04)5
BCSC (Pos. Other) 6.13 (10.43)5 6.19 (4.51)5
Emotionality DES (Interest) 10.31 (11.51)6 2.55 (1.81)6
(General) DES (Enjoyment) 9.48 (12.19)6 2.70 (1.83)6
DES (Surprise) 8.55 (7.76)6 2.74 (2.23)6
DES (Sadness) 8.91 (6.60)6 3.12 (1.98)6
DES (Anger) 8.73 (7.73)6 3.23 (1.98)6
DES (Disgust) 8.33 (4.88)6 3.04 (1.83)6
DES (Contempt) 7.48 (5.45)6 2.82 (1.95)6
DES (Fear) 6.83 (5.13)6 3.37 (1.95)6
DES (Guilt) 9.13 {5.I l f 2.94 (1.98)6
DES (Shame) 8.02 (5.59 )6 3.25 (2.16)6
DES (Shyness) 7.21 (6.42)6 3.19 (1.81)6
DES (Self-Hostility) 7.09 (5.27)6 3.31 (1.85)6
Distress DASS21 (Total) 20.83 (25.33)7 15.68 (DNA)7
Note'. Published means and standard deviations shown in parentheses. DNA = Data not 
available within published studies.
1 Offender sample, N =50 (Morrison & Gilbert, 2001)
2 British mentally disordered offender sample, N = 114 (Blackbum, Personal correspondence)
3 British , non-clinical, student sample, N= 152 (Goss, Gilbert & Allan, 1994)
4 British, non clinical, student sample, N= 514 (Cook, 1994)
5 British, non-clinical’ student sample, N=754 (Fowler, Freeman, Smith, Kuipers, Bebbington, Bashforth et al., 2006)
6 American, middle class mothers, N=86 (Izard, Libero, Putnam & Haynes, 1993)
7 Australian psychiatric patients at admission, N=786, (Ng, Trauer, Dodd, Callaly, Campbell and Berk, 2007)
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Social Rank
The Social Comparison Rating Scale (SCRS: Allan & Gilbert. 1995) -  as social rank 
estimate
Allan and Gilbert (1995) used the Social Comparison Rating Scale on two groups of 
participants, the first 263 British university students (mean = 64.67, s.d. = 11.65), 
and the second a clinical group consisting of 32 day hospital patients (mean = 38.90, 
s.d. = 13.47). In the present study means for perceived social rank (mean = 68.32, 
s.d. = 18.44), were more similar to that of the non-clinical sample reported by Allan 
and Gilbert (1995) than the clinical sample, and were comparable to the total sample 
statistics reported within Morrison and Gilbert’s (2001) study (mean = 68.04, s.d. = 
16.59).
Social Expectations
The Social Expectations Inventory (SEI) Blackburn (Personal Correspondence)
Blackburn (Personal Correspondence) used the Social Expectations Inventory with a 
sample of 114 mentally disordered offenders from a Special Hospital. In the present 
study, means for the two subscales relating to people’s expectations of others being 
‘antagonistic’ and ‘trusting’ were lower than those reported by Blackburn (mean = 
24.34 and 25.49, s.d. = 10.96 and 7.37 respectively) indicating that this sample were 
inclined to feel that others would be less antagonistic, but also less trusting towards 
them. However, the subscale pertaining to expectations of others being ‘unassured’ 
was significantly higher within this study (mean = 17.18, s.d.= 5.03) than that 
reported by Blackburn (mean = 9.03, s.d.= 3.44) indicating that this sample showed a 
greater tendency to report that others would be more unassured in their presence.
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Shame
Internalised Shame Scale (ISS: Cook. 1988, 1994): The Other as Shamer Scale 
(OAS: Goss. Gilbert & Allan. 1994)
Cook (1994) used the ISS with a sample of British students and reported a mean of 
33.98, (s.d. = 15.52). Similarly, Goss, Gilbert and Allan (1994) used both the ISS and 
the OAS with a sample of British students. In the present study, the total sample 
mean for internalized shame (mean = 38.96, s.d. = 21.74) was higher than that 
obtained in both the Cook (1994) study (mean = 33.98, s.d.=15.52) and the Goss et 
al, (1994) study (mean = 32.1, s.d. = 16.2), but somewhat lower than the total 
sample mean reported in Morrison and Gilbert’s (2001) study (mean = 46.50, s.d. = 
19.76). Although, comparable data for external shame is not available within 
Morrison and Gilbert’s (2001) study, this study’s sample yielded significantly higher 
scores (mean = 43.85, s.d. = 15.29) on average than the students within Goss et al. ’s 
(1994) study (mean = 20.0, s.d. = 10.1).
Schemata
The Brief Core Schema Scale (BCSS: Fowler, Freeman. Smith. Kuipers. Bebbinston. 
Bashforth, et al., 2006)
Fowler, Freeman, Smith, Kuipers, Bebbington, Bashforth, et al. (2006) used the 
BCSS with a sample of 754 British students. In the present study, means for negative 
self schemas (4.84, s.d.= 4.50), positive self schemas (12.27, s.d.= 6.14) and negative 
other schemas (8.06, s.d.= 10.18) were all higher than those reported by Fowler et al.
(2006) (mean = 3.55, s.d. = 3.55; mean = 10.20, s.d. = 4.23; mean = 4.07, s.d. = 4.04, 
respectively) indicating that they held either a higher degree of, or possibly stronger, 
positive and negative self schemas, as well as either a higher degree of, or possibly
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stronger negative other schemas. However, the mean for the positive other schemas 
subscale was somewhat lower (mean = 6.13, s.d. = 6.19) than that found within the 
Fowler et al. (2006) study (mean = 10.43, s.d.= 4.51) indicating that they held either 
a lower degree of, or possibly weaker, positive other schemas.
Emotionality (General)
The Differential Emotions Scale. Fourth edition (DES-IV; Izard. Libero. Putnam & 
Havnes. 1993)
Izard, Libero, Putnam and Haynes (1993) used the DES on a sample of American, 
middle class mothers. Within the present study means on the ‘Interest’ and 
‘Enjoyment’ subscales were slightly lower than those reported by Izard et al. (1993), 
but slightly higher for all other subscales (surprise, sadness, anger, disgust, contempt, 
fear, guilt, shame, shyness and self-hostility), indicating that the current sample were 
less inclined to report the presence of positive emotions, and much more inclined to 
report the more negative emotions. Of note, ‘Disgust’ and ‘Guilt’ showed the largest 
discrepancy between the two studies. See Table 4 for all means and standard 
deviations.
Distress
The Depression Anxiety Stress Scale-21 Item (DASS-21: Lovibond & Lovibond. 
1995)
Antony, Beiling Cox, Enns, and Swinson (1998) administered the DASS-21 to a non- 
clinical sample and reported a total mean score of 2.58 (s.d. = 2.83). However, Ng, 
Trauer, Dodd, Callaly, Campbell and Berk (2007) administered the DASS-21 to a 
sample of 786 psychiatric outpatients and obtained a total mean score of 25.33 at
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admission, and a mean score 13.38 at discharge (s.d.= data not available). Within this 
study, the sample statistics (mean = 20.83, s.d. = 15.68) were more inline with the 
result obtained within Ng et aV  s (2007) study, specifically with regard to the result 
of the clinical group at admission, indicating that this sample were more inclined to 
report high levels of distress.
3.3 Reliability o f Measures in Current Sample
To assess the internal consistency of the measures used within the study, Cronbach’s 
alphas were computed for each of the scales and subscales (see Table 5). All of these 
scores were above .70, with the exception of SEI ‘unassured’, which achieved an 
alpha of only .59. Of note, Blackburn reported an alpha of .55 for this subscale, 
which was markedly different from his reported scores for ‘antagonistic’ and 
‘trusting’ expectations, which were .90 and .83, respectively. Therefore some degree 
of caution should be applied when making inferences about the construct measured 
within this subscale.
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Table 5. Cronbach’s alphas for all measures
Aspect Being Measured Measure Alpha
Psychopathy PPI-R (Total score) .89
PPI-R (Factor 1) .83
PPI-R (Factor 2) .90
!PPI-R (ME) .82
2PPI-R (RN) .78
3PPI-R (BE) .83
4PPI-R (CN) .84
5PPI-R (SOI) .76
6PPI-R (F) .86
7PPI-R (STI) .76
8PPI-R (C) .85
Social Rank SCRS (Total Score) .91
Social SEI (Antagonistic) .90
Expectation SEI (Trusting) .78
SEI (Unassured) .59
Shame (External) OAS (Total Score) .95
OAS (Inferior) .90
OAS (Emptiness) .82
OAS (How others behave...) .89
Shame (Internal) ISS (Shame) .96
ISS (Self esteem) .78
Schemata BCSC (Neg. Self) .80
BCSC (Pos Self) .84
BCSC (Neg. Other) .88
BCSC (Pos. Other) .90
Emotionality DES (Interest) .77
(General) DES (Enjoyment) .83
DES (Surprise) .81
DES (Sadness) .88
DES (Anger) .91
DES (Disgust) .86
DES (Contempt) .72
DES (Fear) .90
DES (Guilt) .84
DES (Shame) .90
DES (Shyness) .90
DES (Self-Hostility) .89
Distress DASS21 (Total) .96
1 PPI-R: Machiavellian Egocentricity Subscale
2 PPI-R: Rebellious Nonconformity Subscale
3 PPI-R: Blame Extemalisation Subscale
4 PPI-R: Carefree Nonplanfulness Subscale
5 PPI-R: Social Influence Subscale
6 PPI-R: Fearlessness Subscale
7 PPI-R: Stress Immunity Subscale
8 PPI-R: Coldheartedness Subscale
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3.4 Hypothesis Testing
Two-tailed tests were used as it was decided that none of the hypotheses were based 
on associations or differences that were well enough established to warrant one-tailed 
tests.
Correlations between variables 
Social Rank and Shame
As it was predicted that there would be a relationship between perceived social rank 
and the self-conscious emotion of shame (hypothesis 1), Pearson correlation tests 
were performed on the measures of social rank estimate and the various measures of 
shame used within this study. As predicted, it was found that social rank was 
negatively correlated with all measures of shame, and all measures were highly 
statistically significant (see Table 6). For example, for rank and internal shame 
Pearson’s correlation was r= -.462, p<.001,**, whilst for rank and external shame, 
r=-.459, p<.001,**. Of note, all shame measures showed statistically significant 
positive correlations with one another, further demonstrating the high degree of 
construct validity for these measures.
95
Table 6. Correlations between social rank and shame
(ISS)
Internal
Shame
(OAS)
External
Shame
‘Total’
(OAS)
External
Shame
‘Inferior’
(OAS)
External
Shame
‘Emptiness’
(OAS) 
External 
Shame 
‘How others 
behave... ’
(DES)
Shame
(SCRS)
Social
Rank
-.462
**
N=95
-.459
**
N=97
-.510
**
N=97
-.411
**
N=97
-.334
**
N=97
-.437
**
N=96
(ISS)
Internal
Shame
.832
**
N=101
.794
**
N=101
.752
**
N=101
.734
**
N=101
.759
**
N=102
(OAS)
External
Shame
‘Total’
.946
**
N=104
.889
**
N=104
.912
**
N=104
.694
**
N=102
(OAS)
External
Shame
‘Inferior’
.802
**
N=104
.785
**
N=T04
.649
**
N=102
(OAS)
External
Shame
‘Emptiness’
.712
**
N=104
581
**
N=102
(OAS) 
External 
Shame 
‘How others 
behave...’
.683
**
N=102
Note\ * P < .05, **P<.01
Social rank and social expectations
It was predicted that there would be a relationship between social rank and social 
expectations (hypothesis 2) and thus correlations were performed between these two 
variables (see Table 7). As expected, a positive correlation was found between 
perceived social rank and social expectations relating to others being ‘trusting’ 
(r=.327, p=.001,**). A significant, positive relationship was also found between 
perceived social rank and those social expectations that relate to others acting in an 
‘unassured’ or unconfident manner (r=.394, p<.001,**). In addition, a negative 
correlation was found between perceived social rank and social expectations of 
‘antagonistic’ type behaviour (r=-.253, p=.012,**). These results suggest that as
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perceived social rank increases, perceptions about others being unassured, i.e. 
behaving in a passive or submissive manner increase, whilst perceptions about others 
being antagonistic, i.e. behaving in a dominant manner generally decrease.
Table 7. Correlations between PPI-R Factor 1, social rank and social expectations
(SCRS) 
Social Rank
(SEI) 
Expect Trust
(SEI) 
Expect Unassured 
Behaviour
(SEI)
Expect
Antagonism
(PPI-R) .474 .356 -.111 .042
Factor 1 ** **
N=85 N -89 N=87 N=89
(SCRS) .327 .394 -.253
Social Rank ** ** **
N=98 N=96 N=98
(SEI)
Expect Trust -.222
*
.184
N=103 N=105
(SEI)
Expect Unassured .496
Behaviour **
N=103
Note: *P <.05, **P<.01
‘Primary ’ Psychopathy, Social Rank, Social Expectations, and Emotionality 
With regard to psychopathy, it was predicted that those achieving high scores on 
Factor 1 of the PPI-R, that is those with fearless and dominant traits or ‘primary’ 
psychopathic traits, would perceive themselves as being high in social rank 
(hypothesis 3), and as a result of their general feelings of superiority would expect 
others to be submissive rather than antagonistic or dominant towards them 
(hypothesis 7). Table 7 shows the results of the Pearson correlations that were 
performed in order to investigate these hypotheses. Consistent with hypothesis 3, 
Factor 1 was positively correlated with perceived social rank (r=.474, p<.001, **). In 
relation to hypothesis 7, Factor 1 showed no statistically significant relationship to 
expectations of others being antagonistic(r=.042, p=.693, ns), though Factor 1 did
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significantly positively correlate with expectations of others being trusting (r=.356, 
p=.001, **). Unexpectedly, social expectations of others being unassured was not 
significantly correlated with factor 1 (r=-.l 11, p=.307, ns).
It was predicted that those achieving high scores on Factor 1 of the PPI-R would be 
less susceptible to personal distress (hypothesis 4), would hold positive self schemas 
and would have high self-esteem (hypothesis 5). Table 8 shows the results of the 
Pearson correlations that were carried out in order to test these predictions. With 
regard to personal distress, as predicted, Factor 1 of the PPI-R appeared to show a 
statistically significant negative correlation (r=-.224, p= 037, *). Also as predicted, 
Factor 1 showed a statistically significant, positive correlated with positive self 
schemas (r=.442, p<.001,**), and a positive correlation appeared between Factor 1 
and self-esteem (r=.330, p= 002, **).
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Table 8. Correlations between PPI-R Factor 1 and multiple variables
(DASS)
Distress
(BCSS) 
Neg. Self 
Schema
(BCSS) 
Pos. Self 
Schema
(BCSS) 
Neg. Other 
Schema
(BCSS) 
Pos. Other 
Schema
(ISS)
Self-esteem
(PPI-R) ..224 -.183 .442 .059 .157 .330
Factor 1 * ** **
N =87 N=88 N =89 N=88 N =88 N=88
(DASS) .578 -.487 .143 -.209 -.451
Distress ** ** **
N =100 N= 101 N =98 N =98 N=99
(BCSS) -.328 .355 -.122 -.417
Negative Self ** ** **
Schemas
N =102 N=99 N =99 N =100
(BCSS) .066 .425 .620
Positive Self ** **
Schemas
N =100 N -1 0 0 N=101
(BCSS) .092 .007
Negative
Other
Schemas .362 .942
N =100 N=98
(BCSS) .221
Positive Other
Schemas .029
N=98
Note\ *P  <.05, **P<.01
In order to assess whether Factor 1, was associated with shame (hypothesis 6), 
Pearson correlations were computed for this variable along with internal and external 
shame total scores. With regard to Factor 1 and internal shame, a negative correlation 
was found (r=-.176, p= 101, ns), though this was not statistically significant. In 
addition, regarding Factor 1 and external shame, a negative correlation appeared (r=- 
.082, p=.444, ns), but again this result was not statistically significant.
Regarding emotionality more broadly, it was predicted that those achieving high 
scores on Factor 1 of the PPI-R would be more inclined to report experiencing more 
positive emotions, i.e. interest and/or enjoyment, rather than negative emotions, i.e. 
sadness, anger, disgust, contempt, fear, guilt, hostility inwards and/or shame 
(hypotheses 6 and 8). However, as both internal and external shame had already been
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analysed, DES Shame was removed from this analysis. Table 9 shows the results of 
these tests.
Table 9. Correlations between PPI-R Factor 1 and emotionality
(DES) (DES) (DES) (DES) (DES) (DES) (DES) (DES) (DES)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Int. Enj. Sad. Anger Disg. Cont. Fear Guilt Host.
(PPI-R) .310 .361 -.203 -.106 -.058 .192 -.150 -.031 -.200
Factor 1 ** **
N=89 N=89 N=89 N=89 N=89 N=89 N=89 N=89 N=89
(DES) .508**
-.040 .014 .097 .166 .052 .123 -.028
1
Interest N=103 N=103 N=103 N=103 N=103 N=103 N=103 N=103
(DES) -.346 -.330 -.225 -.006 -.142 -.087 -.322
2 ** * 44
Enjoy­ 19=103 N=103 N=103 N=103 N=103 N=103 N=103
ment
(DES)
.729
**
.698
**
.275
*
.589
**
.472
44
.706
44
3
Sadness N=103 N=103 N=103 N=103 N=103 N=103
(DES) .614**
.342 .443
4 4
.363
44
.629
44
4
Anger N=103 N=103 N=103 N=103 N=103
(DES) .382**
.413
**
.522
44
.707
44
5
Disgust N=103 N=103 N=103 N=103
(DES) .396 .307 .297
6 4 4
Contempt N=103 N=103 N=103
(DES) .474 .591
7 44 44
Fear N=103 N=103
(DES) .551
8 44
Guilt N=103
Note: * P <.05, **/*<.01
With regard to Factor 1, as predicted a positive correlation was found for both 
interest and enjoyment (r=.310, p=003, **, and r=.361, p=.001,** respectively), 
whilst the more negative emotions of sadness, anger, disgust, fear, guilt and hostility 
inwards were not significantly correlated with Factor 1. Of interest, contempt
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appeared positively correlated with Factor 1, (r=.192, p=.072, ns) though not to a 
significant degree.
‘Secondary ’ Psychopathy, Social Rank, Social Expectations and Emotionality 
With regard to psychopathy, Pearson correlations were performed on Factor 2 of the 
PPI-R, which related to impulsive antisocial traits, in order to test predictions that 
were made regarding the relationship between ‘secondary’ psychopathy, social rank 
and social expectations (hypotheses 9), (see Table 10). With regard to Factor 2 and 
social rank a significant negative relationship was observed as expected (r=-.312, 
p=.004,**). In addition, Factor 2 was significantly, positively correlated with social 
expectations of antagonistic type behaviour (r=.451, p<.001,**) and somewhat 
unpredictably with expectations of others being unassured (r=.298, p=005,**). 
Factor 2 appeared to be negatively correlated with expectations of others being 
trusting (r=-.l 13, p=.293, ns), although not to a statistically significant degree.
Table 10. Correlations between ‘PPI-R Factor 2, rank and expectations
SCRS 
Social Rank
SEI
Expect
‘Antagonism’
SEI
Expect
‘Trust’
SEI
Expect
‘Unassured’
PPI-R -.312 .451 -.113 .298
Factor 2 ** ** **
N=85 N=89 N-89 N=87
SCRS -.253 .327 -.217
Social Rank * ** *
N=98 N=98 N=96
SEI .184 .496
Expect **
‘Antagonism’ N=105 N=103
SEI o n
Expect *
‘Trust’ N=103
Note: * P< .05, ** P< .01
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‘Secondary ’ Psychopathy & Shame
It was predicted that those individuals that scored highly on Factor 2 would report 
high levels of internal and external shame, suffer from a low self-esteem and be more 
susceptible to experiencing the negative emotions of anger, guilt and general distress 
(hypothesis 9). To explore these hypotheses Pearson correlations were performed 
(see Table 11).
Table 11. Correlations between PPI-R Factor 2‘ and emotionality
(ISS)
Internal
Shame
(ISS)
Self-Esteem
(OAS)
External
Shame
(DES)
Anger
(DES)
Guilt
(DASS)
Distress
(PPI-R) .550 -.298 .475 .442 .384 .530
Factor 2 ** ** ** ** ** **
N=88 N=88 N=89 N=89 N=89 N=87
(ISS) -.464 .832 .569 .557 .774
Internal ** ** ** ** * *
Shame N=102 N=101 N=102 N=102 N=99
(ISS) -.466 -.345 -.198 -.451
Self-Esteem ** ** * **
N=101 N=102 N=102 N=99
(OAS) .423 .407 .706
External ** * * **
Shame N=102 N=102 N=100
(DES) .363 .549
Anger ** **
N=103 N=100
(DES) .475
Guilt **
N=100
Note: * P< .05, ** P< .01
As predicted, Factor 2 was found to positively correlate with both internal shame 
(r=.550, p<.001,**) and external shame (r=.475, p<.001,**). These results were both 
highly statistically significant, indicating that scores for Factor 2 increase inline with 
a person’s propensity to experience shame. Also, as previously hypothesised, Factor
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2 was found to correlate negatively with self-esteem to a highly significant degree 
(r=-298, p=.006,**). With regard to other emotions, highly significant positive 
correlations were found for Factor 2 and anger (r=.442, p<.001,**), as well as guilt 
(r=.384, p= 001,**) and general distress (r=.530, p<.001,**).
Statistical Analysis
A multiple regression analysis was performed in order to assess the predictive power 
of the significant correlations for the dependent variable of Factor 1 of the PPI-R, 
that is fearless and dominant traits or ‘primary’ psychopathy. A total of six predictor 
variables were entered into a multiple regression analysis, these included Social 
Rank (SCRS), Social Expectation variable of others being ‘Trusting’ (SEI), Positive 
Self Schemas (BCSS), Enjoyment (DES), interest (DES) and distress (DASS). The 
‘forced entry’ method was used for this analysis as no decision was made with regard 
to the order in which the variables should be entered into the model. The regression 
analysis revealed that the highest correlation within the model was between 
enjoyment and interest (R=.548), therefore as no correlation was above the threshold 
of R=.9 this signified that there was no multicolinearity, and again confirmed that 
each of the predictors within the model measured different constructs. In addition, all 
assumptions of regression were met, including the assumption of independent errors 
(Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.13), suggesting that the model was generalisable 
beyond this sample.
Overall the regression was highly significant (F(6,74)=5.766, p<.001, **). Scores on 
the measures of social rank, social expectations of others being trusting, positive self­
schemas, enjoyment, interest and distress accounted for 31.9% of the variation in
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Factor 1 scores, (R2=.319, Adjusted R2= 263). A significant independent effect was 
found for social rank (2?=2.931, t(l)=2.53, p=.01,**). For all b-values, standard error 
b-values and beta values see Table 12.
Table 12. A multiple regression analysis for PPI-R Factor 1 -  Fearless and dominant 
traits
Model B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 110.57 12.673
Social Rank 2.931** 1.159 0.295
SEI -  ‘Trusting’ 0.110 0.337 0.039
Pos. Self Schemas 0.626 0.321 0.254
Enjoyment 0.541 0.800 0.090
Interest 0.620 0.782 0.095
Distress 
ljr _____ -' -
0.477 1.071 0.053
Note: R2=.319, (p<.01). *P<.05, **P<.01.
A multiple regression analysis was also performed in order to assess the predictive 
power of the significant correlations for the dependent variable of Factor 2 of the 
PPI-R, that is impulsive antisocial traits or ‘secondary’ psychopathy. A total of six 
predictor variables were entered into a multiple regression analysis, these included, 
Social Rank (SCRS), two Social Expectation variables (SEI ‘Unassured’ and SEI 
‘Antagonising’), Internal Shame (ISS) and External Shame (OAS) and Distress 
(DASS). Again the ‘forced entry’ method was used for this analysis as no decision 
was made with regard to the order in which the variables should be entered into the 
model. The regression analysis revealed that the highest correlation within the model 
was between internal shame and external shame (R=.801) signifying a moderate 
degree of multicolinearity between these variables. In general however, all the 
predictors used within this analysis met the multicolinearity assumption, as no 
correlation was above the threshold of R= 9. In addition, all other assumptions of
regression were met, including the assumption of independent errors (Durbin-Watson 
statistic = 1.98) suggesting that the model was generalisable beyond this sample.
Overall the regression was highly significant (F(6,70)=9.582, p<.001,**). Scores on 
the measures of social rank, social expectations of others being unassured and social 
expectations of others being antagonising, as well as internal shame and external 
shame and distress accounted for 45.1% of the variation in Factor 2 scores, (R2=.451, 
Adjusted R =.404). Significant independent effects were found for internal shame 
(5=521, t(l)=2.752, p=.008,**), and for expectations of others being antagonistic 
(5=573, t(l)=2.245, p=.02,*). For all b-values, standard error b-values and beta 
values see Table 13.
Table 13. A multiple regression analysis for PPI-R Factor 2 - Impulsive antisocial 
traits
Model B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 115.40 9.214
Social Rank -0.432 1.590 -0.029
SEI -  ‘Antagonistic’ 0.573* 0.255 0.259
SEI -  ‘Unassured’ 0.611 0.479 0.132
Internal Shame 0.521** 0.189 0.466
External Shame -0.328 0.280 -0.200
Distress 2.429 1.879 0.180
Note: R2=.451 (p<.01). *P<.05, **P<.01.
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4. Discussion
This research project set out to investigate the role of perceived social rank, social 
expectations and emotionality within psychopathy. Taken as a whole, a high degree 
of psychopathic traits were present within the sample, somewhat higher than that 
observed within a similar American study (Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005). With regard 
to social rank, this sample reflected perceptions of high rank status comparable to 
that reported within Morrison and Gilbert’s (2001) study. Of note, the sample means 
within both of these studies were higher than the mean rank estimate of university 
students, and well above scores reported by a group of day hospital patients (Allan & 
Gilbert, 1994), suggesting that high perceived social rank may be common within an 
offender population.
In terms of social expectations, it was found that this sample was inclined to report 
that others would be antagonistic towards them, to a similar degree to that found 
within other offender samples (Blackburn, personal correspondence). However, with 
regard to expectations of others being trusting of them or unassured in their presence, 
results varied from the study reported by Blackburn (personal correspondence), with 
more people in this study reporting higher levels of expected unassured behaviour 
and lower levels of expected trust. It was hypothesised that social expectations would 
vary in line with a person’s perceived rank status. In general, with regard to the 
relationship between social rank and social expectations, results suggested that as 
perceived social rank increased, perceptions about others being trusting and 
unassured, i.e. behaving in a passive, accepting or submissive manner increased, 
whilst perceptions about others being antagonistic, i.e. behaving in a dominant 
manner, decreased.
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Overall, the participants within this study reported lower levels of internal shame 
than that reported by Morrison and Gilbert (2001) who studied mentally disordered 
offenders. However, a higher level of internal shame was found compared to that 
reported within a non-clinical, student sample (Goss, Gilbert & Allan, 1994). These 
findings may suggest that moderate to high levels of internal shame may be 
characteristic within offenders. In accordance with this, higher levels of external 
shame were demonstrated within this sample than reported by a non-clinical sample 
of students (Goss et al., 1994). In addition, it was found that social rank was 
negatively correlated with the self-conscious emotion of shame.
Taken as a whole, this sample held a high degree of both positive and negative self­
schemas, as well as a high degree of negative other-schemas. Positive other-schemas 
were not reported as frequently in this study compared with a published study 
(Fowler, Freeman, Smith, Kuipers, Bebbington, et al., 2006). In addition, although 
positive emotions were reported more frequently than negative emotions within the 
current sample, participants were less inclined to report the presence of positive 
emotions, and much more inclined to report negative emotions when compared with 
a published study (Izard, Libero, Putnam & Haynes, 1993). Finally, a high level of 
general distress was described by this sample, comparable to that found within a 
sample of psychiatric patients (Ng, Trauer, Dodd, Callaly, Campbell & Berk, 2007).
Consistent with Morrison and Gilbert’s (2001) findings, the current study found a 
difference between those defined as ‘primary’ and those defined as ‘secondary’ 
psychopaths, in terms of their self and social evaluative processes, specifically with 
regard to perceived social rank estimate and reported levels of shame and distress.
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As predicted, it was found that as levels of ‘primary’ psychopathy increased, that is, 
as scores on Factor 1 of the PPI-R relating to fearless and dominant traits rose, scores 
on the measure of social rank estimate showed an upward trend, indicating that 
people high in traits associated with ‘primary’ psychopathy perceive themselves as 
being somewhat superior to others. However, with regard to impulsive and antisocial 
traits or ‘secondary’ psychopathy, as scores on Factor 2 of the PPI-R increased, 
social rank estimate showed a downward trend, indicating that people high in traits 
associated with ‘secondary’ psychopathy are more inclined to compare themselves 
poorly to others.
‘Primary’ psychopathy also deviated from ‘secondary’ psychopathy with regard to 
reported levels of shame. Consistent with Morrison and Gilbert’s (2001) findings, the 
current study found a high degree of internal shame within secondary psychopathy, 
with Factor 2 of the PPI-R showing a significant positive correlation with this trait. 
However, unlike within Morrison and Gilbert’s (2001) study, Factor 1 showed a 
significant negative relationship with internal shame scores, supporting previous 
evidence that those who display the more classic psychopathic features are less 
inclined to experience this self-conscious emotion (Cleckley, 1976; Blair, 1995; 
Lykken, 1957; Hare, 1991, 1993). For external shame the findings for fearless and 
dominant traits or ‘primary’ psychopathy was less clear as the correlations were non 
significant. Nonetheless, there appeared to be a negative correlation of r=-.150 
between external shame and Factor 1. Factor 2, relating to impulsive and 
antisociality traits or ‘secondary’ psychopathy, demonstrated a significant positive 
relationship with external shame levels. Interestingly, the current study also found a 
significant positive correlation between Factor 2 and measures of guilt, anger,
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general distress and expectations of others being antagonistic, as well as a negative 
relationship between this factor score and self-esteem. Collectively, these findings 
appear to add support to Blackburn’s (1998) view of those with traits relating to 
‘secondary’ psychopathy, as being characterized by emotional disturbance, social 
anxiety, low self-esteem and social withdrawal.
In contrast, those scoring highly on Factor 1, that is those with fearless and dominant 
traits that relate to ‘primary’ psychopathy, showed low levels of emotional 
disturbance, with a slight negative correlation with reported levels of depression, 
anxiety and stress, supporting much empirical evidence that ‘primary’ psychopaths 
are unlikely, or even unable to experience high levels of fear and/or distress (Arnett, 
1997; Lykken, 1957; van Honk & de Haan, 2000, and Williams, Matthews, & 
MacLeod, 1996). Furthermore, it was found that those individuals that scored highly 
on Factor 1 were more inclined to experience more positive emotions. This was 
particularly true with regard to enjoyment, which was significantly positively 
correlated with Factor 1 or ‘primary’ psychopathy. In addition, this emotion was 
found to have some amount of predictive power when used within a regression 
equation. In addition, negative correlations lend support to the hypotheses that 
‘primary’ psychopaths do not experience high levels of anger (Cleckley, 1976) or 
guilt (Hare, 1980, 1991), although within this study these results were not 
statistically significant. Furthermore, regarding schemas, this study found evidence 
to suggest that those with fearless dominant traits, or ‘primary’ psychopaths, are 
more inclined to hold positive self-schemas than any others.
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As predicted, the social expectations of those with fearless dominant traits, or 
‘primary’ psychopaths, were found to significantly positively correlate with 
expectations that others would be trusting, and negatively correlate with expectations 
that others would be antagonistic. This last finding may be understood in terms of a 
biological or neurological deficit for normal levels of fear or anxiety. Research into 
the attentional biases of psychopaths has revealed that they experience a reduced 
sensitivity to threat than non-psychopaths (Arnett, 1997). Arnett, (1997) posits that 
decreased levels of vigilance to environmental threat play an important role in the 
etiology and maintenance of psychopathy, and as a result this may go some way to 
accounting for the social expectations observed within this study. Alternatively, these 
expectations may lie in the ‘primary’ psychopath’s perception of his social rank, a 
fundamental cognitive distortion relating to his superiority over others. However, 
with regard to others being unassured, the hypothesis that those with fearless, 
dominant traits would expect others to be unassured was not supported.
4.1 Implications
With regard to practical and clinical implications, the current study supported the 
notion that clinically meaningful subtypes of psychopathy can be identified 
(Blackburn, 1975, 1998; Blackburn & Coid, 1999; Herve, 2007; Hicks, Markon, 
Patrick, Krueger & Newman, 2004; Millon & Davis, 1998). Within the current study, 
although it was assumed that those who met the criteria for psychopathy shared many 
behavioural features, the self and social evaluative processes and emotionality of 
those defined as ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ psychopaths differed significantly. For 
example, ‘primary’ psychopaths demonstrated a high degree of positive emotionality 
and reported perceiving themselves as being dominant and high ranking. Conversely,
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those defined as ‘secondary’ psychopaths showed themselves to be significantly 
more emotionally distressed and under-controlled. According to previous research, 
this difference has implications for an offender’s propensity for reactive aggression 
(Blackburn, 1993; Megaree, 1966; Morrison & Gilbert, 2001). Therefore, consistent 
with earlier research, it seems probable that those high in impulsive and antisocial 
traits, or those who could be termed ‘secondary’ psychopaths, would be more 
sensitive to perceived status attack and social put downs than their ‘primary’ 
counterparts (Blackburn, 1993; Megaree, 1966). As a result, we might expect 
‘secondary’ psychopaths to exhibit many of the behavioural definitions associated 
with Bockian and Jongsma’s (2001) ‘Antisocial -  reputation defending’ personality 
disorder subtype. Relevant behavioural definitions for this include, a presentation of 
an ‘image’ o f being tough, indomitable and formidable; reactions of anger and 
defensiveness whenever status is questioned; an over-reactive, irritable and 
aggressive presentation, and an incessant need to enhance or defend one’s own or 
family’s reputation. If this is the case, those defined as ‘secondary’ psychopaths 
would benefit from assistance to deal adaptively with aversive emotions, as well as 
work that enhanced their understanding of their personality traits and the interaction 
between these and their interpersonal functioning (Beck, Freeman, Davis & 
Associates, 1990). Related to this, it is possible that as ‘secondary’ psychopaths show 
a tendency to report being highly emotionally labile, they may share many 
characteristics and traits with individuals with borderline personality disorder. As a 
result, it is possible that those defined as ‘secondary’ psychopaths may also benefit 
from the kind of treatments that have been shown to be effective when working with 
people with a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder, e.g. Dialectical 
Behavioural Therapy. It seems that further exploration and empirical research that
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examines treatments that target the specific needs of the two subtypes of 
psychopathy, would be extremely useful.
With regard to management and engagement issues, it would be expected that those 
high in impulsive and dominant traits or ‘primary’ psychopaths, would see any form 
of treatment as unnecessary, given their high opinion of themselves and their 
tendency towards positive self-schemas and positive emotionality. In addition, if  they 
were to be referred for therapy, it is likely that they would avoid meeting with any 
therapist who they assessed as being inferior to them, and in general, would expect 
therapists to be passive and accepting of them. In addition, those defined as ‘primary’ 
psychopaths, with their low levels of internal shame, may lack the ‘motivational 
distress' to make meaningful engagement in psychotherapy possible. On the other 
hand, it would be expected that ‘secondary’ psychopaths, with their propensity for 
higher levels of general distress (including depression, anxiety and stress), as well as 
higher levels of shame, anger and guilt would be more likely to seek out treatment.
4.2 Limitations and future directions
Although the results of the current investigation are interesting and appear to build 
on the findings of Morrison and Gilbert’s (2001) research, there are some limitations 
to this study. Firstly, the use of self-report measures to test assumptions about 
psychopathy may be regarded by many psychologists to be highly problematic 
(Edens, Hart, Johnson, Johnson & Olver, 2000), especially given that the construct of 
psychopathy is a disorder characterized by deception and a reduced insight into the 
nature and extent of ones own psychological deficits (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006). In
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addition, some researchers have indicated that offenders in general, often show a 
tendency to respond to self-report measures dishonestly (Holden, Kroner, Fekken & 
Popham, 1992), and have a propensity toward positive impression management or 
‘social desirability’. For a counter view however, see Hare (1982) and Lilienfeld and 
Andrews (1996). In addition, while self report measures are considered to be useful 
indicators of emotionality, recently many researchers have tended to rely more 
heavily on objective physiological correlates of emotional states, due to the fact that 
both language and behaviours are more conscious representations that are subject to 
bias or distortion within participants (Kirsch & Becker, 2007). In addition, it is 
known that many individuals, but particularly those with personality disorders, which 
accounts for a large percentage of the offender population, would struggle to 
correctly identify or accurately name their emotional experiences. This has specific 
relevance to the use of the DES, which asked participants to directly report on their 
experience of emotional labels, i.e. how often have you felt happy, sad, nervous, 
frightened, etc. As a result, many psychologists might argue that measuring the 
construct of psychopathy within an offender sample, using a series of self-report 
measures is a particularly vulnerable methodology to employ. However, the fact that 
participants understood that their data was to be used solely for research, rather than 
decisions about their care or management, may have mitigated the tendency to ‘fake 
good’ on the questionnaires.
Furthermore, it has been argued that self-report is limited by the fact that it can only 
ever gauge subjective emotional states and traits. In addition, as self-report measures 
have been found to agree only moderately (r= .30 to .50) with ratings of personality 
obtained from knowledgeable observers (Kendrick & Funder, 1988) it has been
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argued that a broader picture may be being lost in only taking one perspective of an 
individual’s personality (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2006).
Within the study, the PPI-R was the only measure to include validity scales to 
identify defensiveness, malingering and inconsistent responding. A small number of 
participants’ data was removed from the analysis due to concerns about valid 
responding. It remains possible that many of the other psychometric measures, 
especially those with a high degree of transparency of questionnaire items, may have 
been affected by similar threats to validity, but without standardized validity scales, 
would have been less easily identifiable.
Future studies might therefore consider employing items from a social desirability 
scale or a lie scale throughout the battery of tests, such as the Marlowe-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960), or the Paulhus Deception 
Scale (Paulhaus, 1998) to allow for the general assessment of social desirability, and 
to control for untrue or inconsistent responding. In addition, further research may 
benefit from employing additional measures, which allow knowledgeable observers, 
perhaps a member of staff or someone from the person’s family, to offer an opinion 
on the individual’s personality traits, in order to obtain some of the non-shared 
variance between self and observer ratings of personality.
There is evidence for the validity and reliability of all of the measures used in the 
present study, as outlined in both the method and the results sections. However, as 
with most measures of emotional and psychological constructs, improvements could 
be possible. For example, the Internalised Shame Scale (ISS), which was used in this 
study to measure internal shame, has many items that appear to relate to external
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shame. As a result a moderate to high level of multicolinearity was observed between 
the two measures of internal and external shame suggesting that, as they stand, the 
ISS and the OAS may not be measuring wholly discrete constructs. Furthermore, 
there were concerns regarding the subscale of the SEI, relating to expectations of 
others being unassured. This subscale showed a relatively low level of internal 
consistency compared with all other tests used within this study. Future research may 
therefore benefit from sourcing a more reliable measure of this construct, in order to 
secure more confidence in the results obtained.
A further concern of this study relates to the sampling procedure, as it is possible that 
there could have been a degree of volunteer bias. Heiman (1998) notes that in general 
people who volunteer to participate in field surveys tend to have a higher social 
status and intelligence, and exhibit a greater need for social approval. In addition, it 
is likely that the degree to which people are interested in the research topic, as well 
as their strength of feeling for the particular topic, influences their decision whether 
or not to participate (Heiman, 1998). Although the subject matter within this research 
was not thought to be particularly emotive, it remains possible that some of 
participants within the current study may have been more motivated to volunteer 
than other prisoners due to the fact that they were particularly interested in the 
research topic or had a greater need for social approval, and thus volunteering would 
have afforded them an opportunity to portray themselves, or the group that they were 
being asked to represent, i.e. offenders, in a particular way.
This study has suggested that a high degree of perceived superiority may be common 
within a UK offender population. However, further research is required, both within
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this country, as well as within other countries, in order to obtain more understanding 
about social rank estimate within offenders generally, and psychopaths specifically. 
Further research may also utilise some of the constructs in this study, for example 
social rank perception, social expectations, schemas and emotionality, to explore 
whether there are differences to be found between incarcerated, or criminal 
psychopaths, and those termed “successful” psychopaths, that is those that are living 
in the community, either not offending or at least those better able to avoid detection.
4.3 Conclusion
Although a number of limitations to the study are discussed above, the following 
conclusions appear to be quite solidly established: 1) Primary psychopaths deviate 
from secondary psychopaths, specifically with regard to reported levels of shame and 
distress and this is consistent with past research, as well as clinical lore that primary 
psychopaths are poor candidates for traditional psychological therapies that focus on 
emotional distress; and (2) Primary psychopaths expect others to be compliant and 
yielding and this may elicit actions from others that maintain the psychopaths’ 
dominant or superior view of themselves.
It seems that much work is still to be carried out with regard to the self and social 
evaluative processes involved in psychopathy, but it is hoped that this study has gone 
someway to increase current knowledge of the role of these constructs within this 
complex, and socially devastating disorder. In addition, it is hoped that the noticeable 
differences observed between the two subtypes identified, increase the diagnostic 
sensitivity and specificity of the disorder by highlighting important risk and 
protective factors, specifically associated with the subtypes.
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Part 3: Critical Appraisal
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Abstract
This paper will reflect on the process of having carried out a study investigating the 
self and social evaluative processes of offenders. The paper is divided into two broad 
sections. The first will build upon some of the methodological issues that were raised 
within Part 2 of this thesis. In addition, it will outline some of the observations that 
were made with regard to the possible dynamic that exists between male offender 
participants and female researchers. The concluding section will consider some of 
the systemic issues and ethical dilemmas that were encountered whilst carrying out 
research in a prison. Throughout the paper, concerns about the level of overcrowding 
in our prisons today are outlined.
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1, Introduction
Within this paper, I will attempt to offer a critical appraisal of the research that I have 
carried out, by initially expanding upon some of the methodological issues raised 
within the discussion section of the main research paper (Part 2). I will then 
endeavour to offer an account of some of my observations, as well as the personal 
and moral issues that came up for me whilst carrying out data collection within a 
prison environment. It is hoped that this may afford future researchers, who may be 
interested in carrying out research in prison, the opportunity to consider some of 
these points, prior to commencing their work. In order to enable the reader to 
understand some of the difficulties that I encountered I will also provide a brief 
description of the setting, in the hope that this may prove useful in understanding the 
context of the problems/concerns I faced.
2. Methodological Issues
The Self Report Method
As suggested within the discussion section of Part 2, the use of self-report measures 
to test assumptions about psychopathy is regarded by many psychologists as being 
highly problematic (Edens, Hart, Johnson, Johnson & Olver, 2000). In addition, 
some researchers have suggested that offenders in particular, show a tendency to 
respond to self-report measures dishonestly (Holden, Kroner, Fekken & Popham, 
1992). With regard to the present research, there were grounds to believe that the 
majority o f the responses given were ‘honest’ self-reflections. One reason for 
holding this view is that the battery of tests administered was quite large, containing 
over 300 items, and to participate took a reasonable amount of the prisoners’ time.
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Participants were told in advance that completion of the questionnaire would take 
approximately 45 minutes to an hour, and were given the opportunity to change their 
minds in advance of electing to participate. The fact that this did deter a few 
prisoners from volunteering gives me some confidence that those who did complete 
the test battery were genuinely interested in helping in the study, and thus attempted 
to provide truthful responses. In addition, those participants who did seem more 
flippant in their approach to the study generally took a questionnaire to complete, but 
mostly did not return them or Tost’ them over the lunch hour. Moreover, participants 
did not appear concerned that the research topic was either intrusive or irrelevant, 
and so again I feel that participants would not have purposefully attempted to provide 
false answers for either of these reasons. Furthermore, on completion of the 
questionnaire, when asked whether they had any concerns or feedback about the 
study, most commented that it had been interesting, and some could talk 
knowledgably about the questions that they had completed. Indeed, some commented 
that they had enjoyed having an opportunity to reflect on the way in which they 
thought about and interacted with others. This suggested that, on the whole, 
participants were giving their responses some degree of thought, and trying to give 
honest answers, rather than randomly circling responses or purposely being 
deceptive.
With regard to the participant’s motivation to engage, it seemed that this ranged from 
getting positive feedback and a small amount of time and attention from a female 
researcher, to simply having something to do, especially during ‘lock up’ (a two hour 
period in the middle of the day when lunch was served, followed by a period when 
staff retreated for their lunch break). A small chocolate bar was given to the
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participants by way of a ‘thank you’ on completion of the questionnaire, but I feel 
that this, in itself, would not have motivated respondents to complete the study. 
Therefore, overall I have no reason to assume that participants were motivated to 
complete the test in order to sabotage the study by giving false responses.
Related to the issue of ‘honest’ responding, some psychologists, particularly 
psychoanalysts and social psychologists, express grave doubts about the self-report 
method (Barker, Pistrang and Elliot, 2002). In general, psychoanalysts have little 
regard for this approach, as they believe that conscious self-knowledge is limited, 
with important feelings existing unconsciously that are guarded by defence 
mechanisms, such as denial or repression. Social psychologists on the other hand, 
consider that it is biases (potentially conscious and unconscious), which exist to 
affect peoples’ ability to offer ‘true’ judgements. For example, Fiske and Taylor 
(1991) report on the ‘self-serving bias’, a tendency to take credit for success and 
deny responsibility for failure. It is therefore plausible that both defences and biases 
come into play in the collection of data via self-report methods, and however well 
meaning the participant, or unintentional the act, data collected in this way will 
always contain some amount of ‘false’ or deceptive, albeit mainly self-deceptive, 
responses.
Advancement made in the quality of self-report measures however, specifically with 
regard to the research field of psychopathy, are beginning to provide researchers and 
clinicians alike with increased confidence in the self-report method. Although 
traditionally in clinical settings, where the dominant view has been that a diagnosis 
of psychopathy should not be based on self-report evidence alone, but instead be
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supported by substantial corroborative information, advances in self-report tools 
have produced some hopeful and interesting preliminary findings regarding an 
alternative approach. For example, research evidence suggests that the Psychopathic 
Personality Inventory (PPI: Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996) a self report measure, and 
the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991) a measure that utilises 
interview, as well as collateral information, correlate significantly with disciplinary 
infarctions among inmates, with neither measure affording significant incremental 
validity above and beyond the other (Edens, Poythress & Lilienfeld, 1999).
Some psychologists, however, continue to maintain that due to many of the reasons 
outlined above, it may prove advantageous for researchers to develop less transparent 
assessment tools that are not dependent on self-reflection and not so vulnerable to 
impression management. These tools would detect emotions without asking about 
them in such a direct manner, perhaps taking the form of performance-based 
measures. It is hoped that these would be less vulnerable to biases, to social 
desirability and to either ‘faking good’ or ‘faking bad’, and therefore prove to be 
more valid assessments of the phenomena under investigation. Whichever the 
preference, it remains that self-report is an extremely common and popular method 
of gathering data across the social sciences with numerous research findings 
discussed in the literature that are based on data gathered in this way (Barker, 
Pistrang and Elliot, 2002). It seems that as long as researchers and clinicians 
understand the potential pitfalls of the self-report approach, utilising this mode of 
data collection affords them a great deal of detail about the way in which people see 
themselves, biases and all.
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This section closes with comments regarding comparative data sets and the 
population norms that are usually available to the researcher who utilises 
standardized self-report measures. An attempt was made to consider the scores 
yielded on the measures used within this study in relation to norms referenced within 
published studies. However, published norms were not always obtained from 
offender samples, which meant that the comparisons were of interest, but were not 
always particularly meaningful given the expected degree of ‘difference’ between the 
various types o f samples. For example, the Differential Emotions Scale (DES; Izard, 
Libero, Putnam & Haynes, 1993) was standardised on a sample of American, middle 
class mothers. It is assumed that these participants would have been very different in 
a number of ways from the sample of mainly British offenders who participated in 
the current study.
Further Research
During times in which some participants offered information about their personal 
experiences, it became apparent that for some, levels of shame and guilt were related 
to the degree to which they felt their crimes had transgressed against the teachings of 
their own or their family’s religion, and/or the dominant ideology of the society they 
originated from, i.e. collectivist or individualistic. Further research into self- 
conscious emotions may therefore benefit from collecting background information 
about participant’s religious faith and societal beliefs, as it is expected that this may 
offer an additional insight into the differing levels of shame within the population.
More specifically, further research into emotionality in offenders may benefit from 
collecting data from community samples of both offenders and non-offenders in
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order to control for the effects of incarceration. It seems possible that being 
sentenced to prison and being separated from society may significantly affect a 
person’s reported levels of self-conscious emotions. In addition, a significant 
percentage of the participants in the current study were ‘on remand’ as opposed to 
being sentenced prisoners. It is possible that this difference in their status at the time 
of the research may have influenced their perception of their rank status, and/or 
affected their reported levels of self-conscious emotions, i.e. shame and guilt, and 
their general thoughts and emotions about others. By concentrating the research on 
sentenced prisoners this study would have been able to control for this variable.
Within the current study, offending histories were not recorded in detail. However, it 
would have been interesting to review this data, as it is possible that the number of 
offences committed may have correlated, to some degree, with the prisoner’s 
propensity for self-conscious emotions. For example, shame levels may have 
increased or decreased in accordance with offending (the latter effect being a 
possible consequence of practice at justifying such behaviour). A person’s offending 
history, specifically types of offending, may also relate to an offender’s perceived 
social rank, to social expectations and to many self and other schemas. Therefore, 
further research in this area, might consider collecting information about prisoner’s 
offending histories in more detail than time permitted in the present study.
Gender Issues
Male prisons are predominantly male environments, with a relatively small 
proportion of female staff that have direct contact with inmates. Perhaps, because of
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this fact, the offenders I approached appeared to be highly motivated to participate in 
the study. Although enthusiasm to participate might be an expected outcome 
amongst inmates suffering from boredom, perhaps the extent to which they were 
eager, and the style in which their keenness was expressed, would have been 
different if  the researcher had been male. This dynamic has implications not only for 
the present research, but also for any form of research and clinical work between 
male inmates and female staff, where attraction and/or bravado in front of other 
inmates, creates barriers or problems within therapeutic or working relationships. Of 
course, consideration of these dynamics may also open up opportunities for the client 
to consider how their attitudes and behaviours towards females may be interfering 
with other professional relationships or even affecting their propensity to offend.
Although having a female researcher had some definite advantages in working with 
this sample, such as ease of recruiting, the disadvantages included a possible 
volunteer bias, with regard to those who saw participation as an opportunity to have 
time or contact with a female researcher.
Behavioural Concerns
Perhaps related to some of the above points, the behaviour of participants was 
interesting, and at times a little worrying. Some offenders went out of their way to 
make themselves available to participate, including missing activities, forming a 
queuing system amongst themselves, and seeking me out to provide me with their 
identification and cell location so that I might locate them to participate on another 
occasion. With regard to more worrying behaviours, a couple jotted comments on 
their questionnaire packs, either giving their mobile telephone number (concerning in
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itself that they may have had access to a mobile) and private address on the ‘outside’, 
or commenting on my “beautiful eyes”. Other inmates went to great lengths to assist 
me in recruiting participants, either by volunteering cellmates or by trying to insist 
that some prisoners took part. This dynamic has implications with regard to both 
potential problems of participants feeling either coerced or bullied into participating 
or problems relating to the quality of the data provided, e.g. offering answers to the 
questionnaires that related to presenting an image of themselves to a female 
researcher as being either caring, sensitive, modest, strong, dominant, competitive, 
virile, etc., depending on what they viewed were sexually desirable traits. With 
regard to participants feeling bullied, I felt comfortable that no one who took part in 
the study felt unduly coerced into participating, as informed consent was achieved 
away from the glare of other offenders. However, with regard to the second concern, 
it remains possible that some of the answers provided were influenced by a desire to 
create a ‘good’ or ‘sexually desirable’ impression.
3. Research in Prison
Background Information
My Contact within the prison was a Social Worker and, as a result, for approximately 
four months at the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008, I was based within the 
Mental Health Team of a busy inner city prison. During the time that I was collecting 
data, the national prison population was greater than it had ever been, with 
approximately 82,000 inmates within 142 institutions throughout England and Wales 
(HM Prison Services Monthly Population Bulletin: March, 2008). Of note, this 
population figure is the highest within Western Europe (Prison Reform Trust, 2008).
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Within the prison where I conducted my research, the Certified Normal 
Accommodation (CNA), or uncrowded capacity, was 87%. According to the Prison 
Services Monthly Population Bulletin (2008), “CNA represents the good, decent 
standard of accommodation that the Prison Service aspires to provide all prisoners”. 
At the time that I was collecting data the ‘In use CNA’ stood at 142%. The issue of 
overcrowding is one that I will return to below, as I feel it has relevance for many of 
the concerns I experienced.
Time Pressures
As is the case with many secure institutions or sensitive environments, gaining 
access to carry out research can be fraught with difficulties. In general, these types of 
institutions have their own set of governance procedures, which need to be satisfied 
prior to permission being granted to access a potential research sample. In addition to 
these, as is the case with many large institutions, systemic pressures, staffing changes 
and leave periods, have a tendency to slow the process of gaining access to the 
environment. Many of these issues were relevant to my experience, and had the 
result of severely delaying the start of data collection, adding an additional time 
pressure to an already time limited process.
Safety and Security
Related to time pressures, was the decision I took to be escorted during my time 
within the prison. I had contacted previous researchers who had carried out work 
within the same establishment, and had discovered that they had been given freedom 
of movement within the prison, as they had been ‘key trained’ (participated in a 
security induction in order to be allocated keys). However, I took advice from my
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contact, that to request that I be key trained would only delay the start of data 
collection further, perhaps considerably.
In taking this advice, subsequently I had to ask someone to interrupt their work every 
time I needed to move within the prison, be it to distribute questionnaires, collect 
them back, or indeed go to the lavatory. Although inconvenient for all, I took some 
consolation in the fact that to be escorted would afford me some amount of safety 
and security whilst I collected data in an unknown and potentially unsafe 
environment. However, I feel the team very quickly got used to me being around, 
and as a result I feel my ‘escorted visitor’ status lapsed in their minds, and soon I was 
entrusted to move more freely around the prison. On reflection, it seemed that in 
their view, being escorted was more about accompanying me in order to unlock 
doors, rather than about ensuring my safety within the prison or protecting the 
security of the establishment.
Although initially members of the Mental Health Team were very willing to 
volunteer to collect me from the front gate in order to escort me to my base, with 
regard to shadowing me for an hour or two whilst I collected data, understandably, 
this proved to be more difficult for them. As a result, I was escorted to a wing and 
required to make contact with an available Prison Officer in order to introduce 
myself and my research and request that I might be able to approach some of the 
prisoners to see if  they would be willing to participate. This was met with a variety of 
responses. Some officers were very happy to help and would allocate an Officer to 
accompany me around the landings so that I might approach potential participants. 
Others however, waved an arm at me and said, “Sure.. .Go ahead”.
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As someone with experience of secure settings, I was aware of the hazards of my 
environment, but was also acutely aware that I could not carry out any form of 
meaningful risk assessment. I knew nothing of the background of the prisoners I was 
approaching, including their propensity for violence, their attitudes towards staff and 
to women in particular. As I understand it, the Prison Officer’s role is more of 
containment and management rather than that of offering care provision. As such, it 
would have been meaningless for me to ask for a ‘handover’, as I would usually have 
done when working in a secure clinical environment. Furthermore, the sheer number 
of prisoners meant that knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of the individuals I was to 
meet could not possibly have been understood or conveyed to me by the staff on 
shift. Consequently, I was under pressure to collect my data, but without being aware 
of any of the current stresses that the prisoners faced on an individual basis and, 
therefore, was only able to surmise how they may have perceived me. At this point, I 
struggled with an internal conflict. On the one hand, for my personal safety, I felt I 
needed to treat each prisoner as a potential threat, a potential assailant or rapist. 
However, simultaneously, my value system is such that I wanted to treat them with 
respect, dignity and as individuals.
These strong feelings were compounded when, on one occasion whilst I was on the 
wing collecting questionnaires back, a Prison Officer got attacked and severely 
assaulted. This had the affect of heightening my awareness of the potential threats 
that were around, and over time I began to be more hypervigilant and uncomfortable 
on the wings, rather than less.
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These strong feelings began to have consequences outside of prison. I was aware that 
my attitudes towards men had temporarily changed during the hours that I spent in 
prison. My hypervigilance to possible threat often continued into my journey home. 
Whilst walking from the prison, as well as during the time that I stood on the 
platform waiting for the tube, and throughout my tube and train journeys home, I 
scanned my environment and questioned my safety in the presence of some of the 
men around me. These feelings were relatively transitory, but nonetheless they 
appeared to be affecting me in the short term.
Supervision and Self-Care
Regarding supervision, my prior experience of ‘research supervision’ had perhaps 
influenced my thinking and use of support whilst carrying out this study. Previous 
projects I had worked on had provided a culture where utilising supervision was 
more about having a space to consider the pragmatics of carrying out the research 
and any ethical issues that may have arisen for the participants, as opposed to 
providing an arena for seeking personal reflection and support. As a result, it was 
only when I noticed that my feelings and attitudes might have been relevant to my 
clinical work (within a forensic setting) that I allowed myself to utilise clinical 
supervision to reflect on these concerns.
‘Prisoner ’ versus ‘Patient ’
Over the four months it took to collect the data, I experienced many difficult feelings 
being in the prison. For example, I was intensely aware of some of the differences 
between the prisoners that I was meeting whilst carrying out my research and the
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patients that I was working with during my final placement within a high secure 
hospital.
It appeared that crowded conditions and different philosophies of practice meant that 
offenders in prison had reduced opportunities for rehabilitation compared with those 
in hospitals, classified as ‘mentally disordered offenders’. In addition, daily living 
conditions appeared far worse within prison, with people living four to a cell, being 
required to use communal shower and toileting facilities, and having to eat their 
meals in their cells. Moreover, with periods for work and social time not being 
guaranteed, prisoners were locked up for many hours throughout the day. The 
amount of time that prisoners had out of their cells seemed to depend on a number of 
issues, including staffing numbers and/or the perceived ‘safety status’ of the wing. 
From speaking with some prisoners about these issues, feelings ranged from 
frustration to total inertia. What seemed puzzling and somewhat upsetting from my 
perspective was that in many cases it was only ‘chance’ that had influenced whether 
or not offenders were in prison or hospital, as many of the individuals in prison are 
known to have severe mental health and/or personality problems that would satisfy 
the criteria for transfer to hospital (Coid, 1988; Cooke, 1994; Cooke, 1995).
Additional difficulties arose for me when prisoners would approach me on the wing 
to ask who I was. Once I had told them I was a Psychologist, and explained to those 
who asked what that was, many would go on to outline a problem that they had, 
which might benefit from the kind of talking therapy that I had described. However, I 
was very aware that the psychology service offered within the prison was limited to 
mainly offering offence related group work. As a result, I was left with a realisation
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that I was raising their awareness of a support system that might help to either 
alleviate their distress or help them with the specific behavioural difficulties that they 
described, whilst knowing that they were in no place to receive it. I was aware the 
Mental Health Team within the prison were doing their best to reach as many 
prisoners as they could but, with only seven staff members, their attention had to be 
with those at the severe end o f the spectrum, usually those with acute positive 
symptoms of psychosis.
Overcrowding
I feel that many of the issues raised above would have been compounded by the 
levels of overcrowding that I witnessed within the prison system at the time that I 
carried out my study.
The persistence of overcrowding has routinely been regretted by senior managers and 
condemned by a variety of interested commentators, such as successive Chief 
Inspectors of Prisons, representatives of the Prison Governors’ Association and the 
Prison Officers’ Association (Sparks, 2001). All have stated that the conditions that 
result from overcrowding have a major effect on both prisoners and staff. For 
example, as well as the immediate problems of daily management of so many 
prisoners, with regard to housing, feeding, bathing, clothing, exercising, escorting 
them to court, on visits, to education or work, it has been found that rates of suicide, 
self-harming, violence and bullying increase in line with the population (Howard 
League, 1999; Liebling, 1992; Prison Reform Trust, 1999; Sparks, 2001). Indeed 
some recent statistics report that, in 2007, 92 prisoners committed suicide, compared 
with 67 in 2006, whilst 23,420 incidents of self-harm occurred within English and
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Welsh prisons during 2006 (Prison Reform Trust, 2008). Unsurprisingly, Prison 
Officer numbers have failed to keep pace with the increase in inmates over the last 
decade (Prison Reform Trust, 2008), whilst less unexpectedly, the Prison Officers’ 
Association has argued strongly that material strain on space and human resources 
severely inhibits efforts to engender greater professionalism and creativity in 
working practices (Prison Reform Trust, 1999).
It seems that prison can be a dehumanising environment at the best of times, where 
people are warehoused, moved around from one prison or cell location to the next, 
without regard for their feelings or relationships. However, during periods of 
overcrowding, individual needs are often sidelined altogether, in order to meet basic 
needs for all. Somewhat disturbingly, within the current study, reported levels of 
distress on the Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995) were comparable to levels recorded within a sample of high to moderately 
disturbed psychiatric patients (Ng, Trauer, Dodd, Callaly, Campbell and Berk, 2007). 
In part, this effect may have arisen due to the broad effects of imprisonment, but I 
feel that there is evidence to suggest that the specific effects that stem from 
overcrowding further increase levels of stress.
Furthermore, I observed that a large percentage of the accommodation of an entire 
wing within the prison was dedicated to foreign prisoners, many of whom could not 
speak English. I would hypothesise that the degree of reported depression, anxiety 
and stress within the English speaking participants in my study would have been 
significantly increased within those offenders who could not communicate 
effectively with staff or fellow inmates.
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Of interest, and related to the reported high levels of distress, Paris (1997) posits that 
there may be an overlap between the personality disorders of antisocial personality 
disorder (ASPD), a disorder that approximately eighty percent of individuals within 
any prison population would meet DSM-IV criteria for (REF), and borderline 
personality disorder (BPD). Paris (1997) suggests that ASPD and BPD represent two 
aspects of the same psychopathology given that they share as their central features 
impulsivity and emotional lability. Moreover, he asserts that when individuals from 
either diagnostic grouping are prevented from utilising their preferred coping 
strategy, i.e. aggression towards others within ASPD and self-harming behaviour 
within BPD, those with ASPD start to act in ways that resemble individuals with 
BPD and vice versa. This may therefore help to explain the increase in some of the 
reported phenomena noted above i.e. suicide, self-harming, depression, anxiety and 
general distress, within individuals who, more commonly, would be inclined to 
utilise violence and aggression during times of high distress.
Media Representations
On 25th April 2008, just following the completion of my data collection, a member of 
the Prison Officers’ Association commented to the press, that prisoners do not take 
opportunities to escape because “life is so cushy within the prison system” (BBC 
News, 2008). He spoke of the availability of drugs and in some cases the wide scale 
use of prostitutes within some prisons. He further commented on a general shortage 
of Prison Officers and of relaxed regimes, where prisoners were not required to 
engage in any meaningful work, but instead spent their days enjoying satellite 
television and video game consoles. This media report follows many others that 
repeatedly speak of prison being a “holiday camp”. More balanced reporting also
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mentions the suicide and self harm rates, but it seems that this does not appear to 
attract the same degree of media coverage.
It may be true that incarceration affords prisoners time away from immediate 
stressors i.e. money concerns, employment, relationship difficulties, etc., however I 
feel it should also be acknowledged that it separates families, breaks down social 
support networks, and disrupts progress in education and employment. In addition, 
the fact that drugs are prolific within many prisons means that any attempts to 
rehabilitate offenders will be lost within an environment that permits some of the 
fundamental antecedents of crime to flourish. In my view, media attention that 
highlighted this issue would prove more useful to society than continually 
propagating the image of the ‘cosy’ prisoner. As Psychologists working with and 
around offenders, I feel that we have a role, and perhaps a responsibility, to highlight 
concerns, such as these. In addition, carrying out meaningful research that may 
support these observations would be highly advantageous.
4. Conclusion
Within this paper, I have offered a very subjective account of carrying out research in 
prison, which was influenced by many factors, including my prior and concurrent 
experience of working in secure settings, the political context at the time at which I 
collected the data and, perhaps, my gender. However, it is hoped that this account 
may still prove useful in outlining some of the issues and difficulties that may arise 
for Psychologists working and, specifically carrying out research, within a prison 
setting.
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UCL GRADUATE SCHOOL
UCL RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE TTTTiT
Dr P eter Scragg 
D epartm ent of Anthropology 
UCL
April 2007 
Dear Dr Scragg
Notification of Ethical Approval
Project ID/Title: 0881/001: Study of personality and social behaviour
I am pleased to confirm that the UCL R esearch Ethics Committee has approved your 
research proposal for the duration of the project. However, it w as suggested  that:
• all re ferences to ‘psychopathy’ should be rem oved from the participants copy of the 
study results;
• the Information S h eet for Participants should be revised to ensure that it is really 
understandable through the u se  of simple, lay language. Som e suggested  changes 
to the information sh ee t a re  a s  follows: ‘I would like to invite you to take part in this
research  project.’ T h e  study aim s to explore their expectations about others
and how often they experience certain em otions.’ ‘You will be asked to go through a 
num ber of questions about your personality ’
Members also ex p ressed  concern with the applicant’s planned one-to-one sessio n s with the 
prisoners. The information provided in D8 of the application form is inadequate. The 
Committee would like to receive clarification on w hether som eone will be with the applicant 
when the interviews are  conducted.
Approval is subject to the following conditions:
1. You m ust seek  Chair’s approval for proposed am endm ents to the research  for which 
this approval h as  been given. Ethical approval is specific to this project and m ust not 
be treated  a s  applicable to research  of a  similar nature. Each research  project is 
reviewed separately  and if there are  significant changes to the research  protocol you 
should see k  confirmation of continued ethical approval by completing the 
‘A m endm ent Approval R equest Form ’. The R equest Form can be accessed  by 
logging on to the ethics w ebsite http://www.grad.ucl.ac.uk/ethics/ and clicking on the 
button m arked ‘Responsibilities Following Approval’.
2. It is your responsibility to report to the Committee any unanticipated problem s or 
ad v erse  events involving risks to participants or others. Both non-serious and 
serious ad v e rse  events m ust be reported.
Reporting Non-Serious Adverse Events.
For non-serious ad v e rse  events you will need to inform  Ethics Committee 
Administrator ( ). within ten days of an adverse incident occurring and 
provide a  full written report that should include any am endm ents to the participant 
information sh ee t and study protocol. The Chair or Vice-Chair of the Ethics Committee will 
confirm that the incident is non-serious and report to the Committee at the next meeting. 
The final view of the Com mittee will be com m unicated to you.
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Reporting Serious Adverse Events
The Ethics Com m ittee should be notified of all serious adverse events via the Ethics 
Committee Administrator immediately the incident occurs. W here the adverse  incident is 
unexpected and serious, the Chair or Vice-Chair will decide whether the study should be 
terminated pending the opinion of an independent expert. The adverse event will be 
considered at the next Com mittee meeting and a decision will be m ade on the need to 
change the information leaflet and/or study protocol.
On completion of the research  you m ust submit a  brief report (a maximum of two sides of 
A4) of your findings/concluding com m ents to the Committee, which includes in particular 
issues relating to the ethical implications of the research.
In the m eantim e, I look forward to receiving feedback on the issues raised by the Committee. 
Yours sincerely
Chair of the UCL Research Ethics Committee
Cc: Sarah Keen, Sub-D epartm ent of Clinical Health Psychology, UCL
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SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS INVENTORY
0 = Never 1 = Rarely 2 = Occasionally 3 = Quite a lot 4 = Very frequently
5 = Usually or Always
Please complete the following statements. Try to be as honest as you can in responding and do not 
miss out any item. Please read each statement carefully and circle the number to the right o f the item 
that indicates how often, in your everyday dealings with others, you expect people UP­
SCALE
1) Avoid you 0 1 2 3 4 5
2) Admit you are right in an argument 0 1 2 3 4 5
3) Confide in you 0 1 2 3 4 5
4) Seek out your company 0 1 2 3 4 5
5) Try to show they are better than you 0 1 2 3 4 5
6) Listen seriously to your opinions 0 1 2 3 4 5
7) Be relaxed in your company 0 1 2 3 4 5
8) Be sympathetic 0 1 2 3 4 5
9) Do things your way 0 1 2 3 4 5
10 Praise or express respect for you 0 1 2 3 4 5
11 Show dislike 0 1 2 3 4 5
12 Be fearful of you 0 1 2 3 4 5
13 Be sincere and open with you 0 1 2 3 4 5
14 Question your honesty 0 1 2 3 4 5
15 Tell you what to do 0 1 2 3 4 5
16 Sneer or be sarcastic 0 1 2 3 4 5
17 Criticise you 0 1 2 3 4 5
18 Ask for your help or advice 0 1 2 3 4 5
19 Be bossy 0 1 2 3 4 5
20 Act in a hostile or angry way towards you 0 1 2 3 4 5
21 Disagree or argue with you 0 1 2 3 4 5
22 Try to persuade you to change your mind 0 1 2 3 4 5
23 Be friendly and helpful 0 1 2 3 4 5
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0 = Never 1 = Rarely 2 = Occasionally 3 = Quite a lot 4 = Very frequently
5 = Usually or Always
How often, in your everyday dealings with others, do you expect people to:-
24) Boast or show off 0 1 2 3 4 5
25) Be distant or on their guard 0 1 2 3 4 5
26) Be unsure of themselves 0 1 2 3 4 5
27) Stop and chat to you 0 1 2 3 4 5
28) Talk too much 0 1 2 3 4 5
29) Try to wind you up 0 1 2 3 4 5
30) Be bashful or shy 0 1 2 3 4 5
31) Be cheerful with you 0 1 2 3 4 5
32) Be confident of their own opinion 0 1 2 3 4 5
Thank you. You have completed this section!
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R eq u est  F or  R esearch  
P a r tic ipa n ts
I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist working within the NHS. 
As part of my Doctoral thesis I am carrying out a piece of 
research looking into personality and its effects on how we 
feel about ourselves and how we relate to others
I am therefore asking if you would be willing to help with the 
research by completing a series of questions about your 
personality, and your expectations of others.
To protect your privacy, the information that you provide will 
be made anonymous, and your answers will be kept strictly 
confidential, meaning that they will not be shared with 
anyone, under any circumstances
Venue: Healthcare Centre or On Wing 
Duration: 45 minutes to 1 hour
WILLING TO HELP?
Please approach a Prison Officer for dates 
and times of participation
MANY THANKS
Sarah Keen
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Information S hee t for Participants in Research S tud ies
You will be given a copy of this information sheet.
Title of Pro ect- Perceived Social Rank, Shame, Social Expectation & Emotioni e o rojec . offenders
This study has been approved by the UCL Research
Ethics Committee [Project ID Number]: 0881/001
Sarah Keen
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
University College London
Sub-departm ent of Clinical Health
I would like to invite you to participate in this research  project. You should only participate if you 
want to; choosing not to take part will not d isadvantage you in any way. Before you decide 
w hether you want to take part, it is important for you to read the following information carefully 
and d iscuss it with others if you wish. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or you would 
like m ore information.
The study:
The study aim s to explore differing personality types within an offender group, to s e e  whether 
they vary in term s of the thoughts they have about them selves, their expectations about others, 
and/or their susceptibility to experience certain em otions m ore frequently than others.
What I am asking you to do:
You will be asked to com plete a num ber of questions about your personality, your expectations, 
and your emotions. The questionnaire should take you between 45 to 60 minutes, 
approximately, to complete.
Other Important Information:
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.
If you choose not to participate it will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are 
otherw ise entitled.
If you decide to take part you will be given this information sh ee t to keep and be asked to sign a 
consent form.
If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.
All data will be collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.
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Informed C onsent Form for Participants in R esearch S tudies
This form is to be completed independently by the participant after reading the Information Sheet and/or 
having listened to an explanation about the research.
Title of Project: Perceived Social Rank, Shame, Social Expectation & Emotion in Offenders
This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics
Committee [Project ID Number]: 0881/001
Participant’s Statement
I .................................................................................................................. agree that I have
■ read the information sh ee t and/or the project h as  been explained to m e verbally;
■ had the opportunity to ask  questions and d iscuss the study;
■ received satisfactory answ ers to all my questions or have been advised of an
individual to contact for answ ers to pertinent questions about the research  and my
rights a s  a  participant and whom to contact in the event of a research-related injury.
I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study without penalty if I so  wish and I 
consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this study only and 
that it will not be used for any other purpose. I understand that such information will be treated 
a s  strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection 
Act 1998.
Signed: Date:
Investigator’s Statement
I ...................................................................................................................  confirm that I have carefully
explained the purpose of the study to the participant and outlined any reasonably  foreseeable 
risks or benefits (where applicable).
“ S '* *  Date:
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